IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


// 


/- 


C  ^"^.^ 


^ 


^ 


1.0 


I.I 


i  «^  IIIIIM 


1.8 


L25  111114   111.6 


7 


^3 


^ 


HiotDgraphic 

Sciences 

Corporation 


23  WSST  MAIN  STREET 

WEBSTER, NY.  M580 

(716)  873-4503 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best 
original  copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this 
copy  which  may  be  bibltographically  unique, 
which  may  alter  any  of  the  images  in  the 
reproduction,  or  which  may  significantly  change 
the  usual  method  of  filming,  are  checked  below. 


□    Coloured  covers/ 
Couverture  de  couleur 


I      I    Covers  damag««d/ 


n 


□ 


n 


Couverture  eniiommagde 

Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  rwstaurie  et/ou  pelliculde 

Cover  title  missing/ 

Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

Coloured  maps/ 

Cartes  g6ographiques  en  couleur 

Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 


I      I    Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations/ 


Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 


Bound  with  other  material/ 
Relii  avac  d'autres  documents 


Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

La  re  Mure  serr^e  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
distortion  le  long  de  la  marge  int6rieure 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restoration  may 
appear  within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these 
have  been  omitted  from  filming/ 
II  se  peut  que  certaines  pages  blanches  ajoutdes 
lors  d'une  restauration  apparaissent  dans  le  texte, 
mais,  lorsque  cela  itait  possible,  ces  pages  n'ont 
pas  6t6  filmdes. 

Additional  comments:/ 
Commentaires  suppldmentaires; 


L'Institut  a  microfilmd  le  meilleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  lui  a  iti  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details 
de  cet  exemplaire  qui  sont  peut-dtre  uniques  du 
point  de  vue  bibliographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier 
une  image  reproduite,  ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  unb 
modification  dans  la  methods  normale  de  filmage 
sont  indiqu6s  ci-dessous. 


I      I   Coloured  pages/ 


Pages  de  couleur 

Pages  damaged/ 
Pages  endommag^es 


□    Pages  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Pages  restaur^es  et/ou  pellicul^es 


• 


Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 
Pages  ddcolordes,  tachet^es  ou  piqudes 


I      I    Pages  detached/ 


Pages  d6tach6es 

Showthrough/ 
Transparence 

Quality  of  prir 

Qualiti  in6gale  de  I'impression 

Includes  supplementary  materia 
Comprend  du  materiel  suppldmentaire 

Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Edition  disponible 


r~7|  Showthrough/ 

I      I  Quality  of  print  varies/ 

I      I  Includes  supplementary  material/ 

I      I  Only  edition  available/ 


n 


Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Les  pages  totalement  ou  partieiiement 
obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une  pelure, 
etc.,  ont  6t6  filmies  d  nouveau  de  facon  d 
obtenir  la  rneilleure  image  possible. 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  est  filmi  au  taux  de  reduction  indiqud  ci-dessous. 

10X  14X  18X  22X 


J 


12X 


1IX 


20X 


atx 


30X 


24X 


28X 


: 


32X 


Th«  copy  filmed  h«re  ha*  be«n  raproducad  thanka 
to  the  ganaroaity  of: 

University  of  British  Columbia  Library 


L'axamplaira  filmA  f ut  raproduit  grAca  A  la 
gintroaitt  da: 

University  of  British  Columbia  Library 


Tha  imagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  bast  quality 
poaslbia  considaring  tha  condition  and  laglblllty 
of  th«:  original  copy  and  in  kaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  apacifica  Ions. 


Las  Imagas  sulvantaa  ont  Ati  raproduitaa  avac  la 
plus  grand  soln,  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattatA  da  Taxampialra  film*,  at  an 
conformity  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  da 
fllmaga. 


Original  copias  In  printad  papar  covars  ara  filmad 
beginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  last  paga  with  a  prints  f  or  illustratad  impras- 
aion,  or  tho  back  covar  whan  appropriate.  All 
othar  original  copias  ara  filmad  beginning  on  the 
first  paga  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  Impres- 
sion, and  anding  on  the  last  page  with  a  printad 
or  illustratad  impression. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
ahall  contain  the  symbol  — ^  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  y  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 


Les  exemplalres  originaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  imprimte  sont  fllmte  en  commenpant 
par  la  premier  plat  at  an  terminant  soit  par  la 
darnlAte  page  qui  comporte  une  emprelnte 
d'Impression  ou  d'lllustration.  soit  par  la  second 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Toua  les  autres  exemplalres 
originaux  sont  f  llmAs  en  commen9ant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  emprelnte 
d'Impression  ou  d'illustration  at  en  terminant  par 
la  darnlAre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
emprelnte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
dernlAre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  le  symbols  — »•  signifie  "A  SUIVRE",  le 
symbols  V  signifie  "FIN". 


Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc..  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  In  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  Atre 
fllmte  A  des  taux  de  reduction  diffArents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  dtre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clichA.  11  est  filmA  d  partir 
de  Tangle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  d  droite, 
at  de  haut  en  has,  an  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  nAcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mAthode. 


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2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

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ADDRESS. 

The  undersigned  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
to  their  respective  Constituents. 


A  Rfjpublick  has  for  its  basis  the 
capacity  and  right  of  the  people  to  govern 
themselves.  JVlvuun  principle  of  a  repre- 
sentative repubnck  is  the  responsibUi^ 
of  the  representatives  to  their  consti- 
tuents. Freedom  and  publicity  of  debate 
are  essential  to  the  preservation  of  such 
forms  of  government.  Every  arbitral.* 
abridgment  of  the  right  of  speech  in  re- 
presen^tives,  is  a  direct  infringement  of 
the  liberty  of  the  people.  Every  unne- 
cessary concealment  of  their  proceedings 
anaiiproximation  towards  tyranny.  When 
by  systematick  rules,  a  majority  takes  to 
itself  the  right,  at  its  pleasure,  of  limit- 
ing speech,  or  denying  it,  altogether; 
when,  secret  sessions  multiply;  and  in 
proportion  to  the  importance  of  questions, 
la  the  studious  concealment  of  debate,  a 
people  may  be  assured,  that  such  prac- 
tices continuing,  their  ireedom  is  but 
shortlived. 

•  Reflections,  such  as  these,  have  been 
forced  upon  the  attention  of  the  under- 
feigned,  members  of  the  house  of  repre- 
sentatives of  the  United  Stutes,  by  the 
events  of  the  present  session  of  congress. 
They  have  witnessed  a  principle,  adopt- 
ed as  the  law  of  the  house,  by  which, 
under,  a  novel  application  of  the  previous 
question,  a  power  is  assumed  by  the  ma- 
jority to  deny  the  privilege  of  speech,  at 
any. stage,  and  under  any  circumstances 
of  debate.  And  recently,  by  un  unpre- 
cedented assumption,  the  rijrht  to  give 
reasons  for  an  original  motion,  has  been 
made  to  depend  upon  the  will  of  the  ma- 
jority. 

Principles  more  hostile  than  these  to  the 
existence  of  representative  liberty,  can- 
not easily  be  conceived.  It  is  not,  how- 
ever, on  these  accounts,  weighty  ua  ihcy 


are,that  the  undersigned  have  undertaken 
this  address.  A  subject  of  higher  and 
more  immediate  importance  impels  them 
to  the  present  duty. 

The  momentous  question  of  war,  with 
Great  Britain,  is  decided.  On  this  topick» 
so  vital  to  your  interests,  the  right  of 
publick  debate,  in  the  face  of  the  world, 
u.A  especially  of  their  constituents,  hai 
been  denied  to  your  representatives.  They 
have  been  called  into  secret  session,  oa 
this  most  interesting  of  all  your  publick 
relations,  although  the  circumstances  of 
the  time  and  of  the  nation,  afforded  no 
one  reason  for  secrec), unless  it  be  found 
in  the  apprehension  of  the  effect  of  pub* 
lick  debate,  on  publick  opinion;  or  of  pub- 
lick opinion  on  the  result  of  the  vote. 

Except  the  message  of  the  president 
of  the  United  States,  which  is  now  be- 
fore the  publick,  nothing  confidential  was 
communicated.  That  message  contained 
no  fact,  not  previously  known.  No  one 
reason  for  war  was  intimated,  but  such 
as  was  of  a  nature  publick  and  notorious. 
The  intention  to  wage  war  and  invade 
Canada,  had  been  long  since  openly  avow- 
ed. The  object  of  hostile  menace  had 
been  ostentatiously  announced.  The  in- 
adequacy of  both  our  army  and  navy,  for 
successful  invasion,  and  the  insufficiency 
of  the  fortifications  for  the  security  of 
our  seaboard  were  every  where  known. 
Yet  the  doors  of  congress  were  shut  upon 
the  people.  They  have  been  carefully 
kept  in  ignorance  of  the  progress  of  mea- 
sures, until  the  purposes  of  administra- 
tion were  consummated,  and  the  fate  of 
the  country  sealed.  In  a  situation  so  ex- 
traordinary,the  undersipjned  have  deemed 
it  their  duty  by  no  act  of  theirs  to  sanction 
u  proceeding,  so  novel  and  arbitrary.  On 

A 


il 


V 


f^^t^S 


???*Er^' 


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-  / 


tte  contrary,  they  ma^e  every  altempti 
in  their  p -werj  to  attain  publicity  for  their 
proceedings.  All  such  attempts  were 
Vain.  When  this  raomentous  subject 
trai  stated,  as  for  debate;  they  demand* 
«d  that  the  doors  should  be  opened. 
, .  This  being  refused,  they  declined  dis* 
cUssion;  being  perfectly  convinced,  from 
indications,  too  plain  to  be  misunderstood 
that,  in  the  house,  all  argument,  with 
dosed  doors,  Was  hopeless;  antl  that  any 
act,  giving  implied  validitv  to  so  flagrant 
an  abuse  of  power,  would  be  little  less 
than  treachery  to  the  essential  rights  of 
a  free  people.  In  the  situation,  to  which 
the  undersigned  have  thus  been  reduced, 
tlicy  are  compelled,  reluctantly  to  resort 
to  this  publick  declaration  of  such  views 
of  the  state  and  relations  of  the  country, 
as  determined  their  judgment  and  vote 
upon  the  question  of  war.  A  measure 
of  this  kit\d  has  appeared  to  the  under- 
signed to  be  more  imperiously  demand- 
ed by  the  circunsstance  of  a  mes- 
sage and  manifesto  being  prepared  and 
circulated  at  publick  expense,  in  which 
the  causes  for  war  were  enumerated,  and 
the  motives  for  it  concentrated,  in  a  man- 
ner suited  to  agitate  and  influence  the 
publick  mind.  In  executing  thiH  task  it 
will  be  the  study  of  tl>e  undersigned  to 
reconcile  the  great  duty  they  owe  to  tlic 
people,  with  that  constitutional  respect 
which  is  due  to  the  administrators  of  pub- 
lick concerns. 

In  commcHcing  this  view  of  our  af- 
IWrs,  the  undersigned  would  fail  in  duly 
to  themselves  did  they  refrain  from  re- 
curring to  the  course,  in  relation  to  pub- 
lick measures,  which  they  adopted,  and 
have  undeviatingly  pursued,  from  the 
commencement  of  this  long  and  t.'ventful 
session;  in  which  they  deliberately  sacri- 
ficed every  minor  consideration  lo  what 
they  deemed  I'le  best  interestfi  of  the 
country. 

For  a  Buecession  of  years  the  under- 
eigncd  have,  from  principle,  disapproved 
a  series  of  restrictions  upon  commerce, 
according  to  their  estimation,  ineflicient 
as  respected  foreign  nations  and  injuri- 
ous) chiefly,  to  ourselves.    Success,  in 


the  system,  had  becone  identified  with 
the  pride,  the  character,  r.nd  the  hope  of 
our  cabinet.  As  is  natural  witlv  men, 
who  have  a  great  stake  depending  on  the 
success  of  a  fitvourite  theory,  pertinacity 
seemed  te  increase  as  its  hopele^icnets 
became  apparent.  As  the  inefficiency  of' 
this  system  could  not  be  admitted,  by  its 
advocates,  without  ensuring  its  abandon- 
ment, ill  success  was,  carefully  attributed 
to  the  influence  of  opposition.     ^ 

To  this  cause  the  people  were  taught 
.  to  charge  its  successive  fisilures  and  not 
to  its  intrinsiek  imbecility.  In  this  state 
of  things  the  undersigned  deemed  it  pro- 
per, to  take  away  all  apology  for  adhe- 
rence to  this  oppressive  system.  They 
were  desirous,  at  a  period  so  critical  ifi 
publick  affairs,  as  far  as  was  consistent 
with  the  independence  of  opinion,  to 
contribute  to  the  restoration  of  harmony 
in  the  publick  councils,  and  concord 
flmong  the  people.  And  if  any  advan^ 
tage  could  he  thus  obtained  in  our  foreign 
relations,  the  undersigned,  being  en< 
gaged  in  no  purpose  ofpersonal  or  party 
advancement,  would  rejoice  in  su(^  an 
occurrence. 

The  course  of  publick  measures  also 
at  the  opening  of  the  session,  gave  hope 
that  an  enlarged  &  enlighter   d  system  of 
defence,  with  provision  for,  or  security  of 
our  maritime  rights,  was  about  to  be  com- 
menced;  a   purpose,   which,    wherever 
found,  they  deemed  it  their  duly  to  foster, 
by  giving,    to  any  system  of  measures, 
thus   comprehensive,  as  unobstructed  a 
course  as  was  consistent  with  their  gene- 
ral sense  of  publick  duty.  After  a  course 
of  policy,   thus  liberal  and  conciliatory, 
it  was  cause  of  regret  that  a  communica- 
Mon    should  have  been  purchased  by  an 
unprecedented  expenditure  of  secret  ser- 
vice money;  and  used,,  by  the  chief  ma- 
gistrate, to  disseminate  suspicion   and 
jealously;    and    tO    excite    resentment, 
among  the  citiEcns,  by  suggesting  impu- 
tations  against  a    portion   of  them,   as 
unmerited  by  their  patriotism,  as  unwar- 
ranted by  evidence. 

It  has  ahva/s  been  the  opinion  of  the 
undersigned,  that  a  system  of  peace  was 


the 

the 

the  1 

from 

wail 

ingb 

ahoul 

into  1 

of  yir 

ten,u 

city  a 

Inhui 

is  coi 

own  I 

our  o\ 

Why, 

that  ol 

peace 

pean  t 

mour, 

Ina< 

dential 

ter  the 

the  pei 

})eculia 
rom  til 
the  poll 
form  of 
cxperin 
indeper 
relation 
well  as 
cipitatc 
to  trial,! 
by  whit 
that  of| 
activity  L 
and  dan| 
ment. 
country! 
institutij 
the    unj 
miatakej 
war,  we) 
only  fro/ 
our  meal 
politicalf 
very  ger 
It  &pA 
wrongs,! 


T 


'^W," 


id  with 
liope  of 
\y  men, 
5  on  the 
tinacUy 
le^sno 
iency  of' 
(1,  by  it« 
ibandon- 
Ltribuicd 

e  taught 
g  and  not 
Lhia  atate 
sd  it  pTO- 
for  adhe* 
a.    They 
:r'uical  ih 
consistetit 
pinion,  to 
harmony 
I  concord 
my  advan- 
>ur  foreign 
being    en- 
lal  or  party 
in  such  an 

wures  also 
gave  hope 
I  system  of 
security  of 
;tobe  com- 

wherever 
ly  to  foster, 

measures, 
jstructcd  a 
their  gene- 
er  a  course 
onciliatory, 
ommunica* 
las.ed  by  an 
'  secret  ser- 
;  chief  ma- 
picion   and 
resentment, 
»ting  impu- 
them,  as 
as  unwar- 

inion  of  the 
f  peace  wa3 


the  policy,  which  most  comporlcd  with 
the  character,  condition,  and  iiUcrcst  of 
the  United  States;  that  their  remoteness 
from  the  theatre  of  contest,  in  Europe, 
was  their  peculiar  felicity  aitd  that  noth- 
ing but  a  necessity,  absolutely  imperious, 
should  induce  them  to  enter  as  parties 
into  wars,  in  which  every  consideration 
of  virtue  and  policy  seems  to  be  forgot- 
ten, under  the  overbearing  sway  of  rapa- 
city and  ambition.  There  is  a  new  era 
in  human  affairs.  The  European  world 
is  convulsed.  The  advantages  of  our 
own  situation  are  ))eculiar.  <«  Why  *  quit 
our  own  to  stand  unoit  foreign  ground  ? 
Why,  by  interweaving  our  destiny  with 
that  of  any  part  of  Europe,  entangle  our 
peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of  Euro- 
pean ambition,  livalship,  interest,  hu- 
mour, or  caprice  ?" 

In  addition  to  thomany  moral  and  pru- 
dential considerations,  which  should  de- 
ter thoughtful  men  from  hastening  into 
the  perils  of  such  a  war,  there  were  some 

fteculiar  to  the  United  States,  resulting 
rom  the  textuix  of  the  government  and 
the  political  relations  of  tlie  people.  A 
form  of  government,  in  no  small  degree 
experimental,  composed  of  powerful  ami 
independent  sovereignties  associated  in 
relations,  some  of  which  are  critical,  at 
>vell  as  novel,  should  not  be  hastily  ])rc- 
cipitated  into  situations,  calculated  to  put 
to  trial,  the  strength  of  the  moral  bond, 
by  which  they  are  united.  Of  all  states, 
that  of  war  is  most  likely  to  call  into 
activity  the  passions,  which  are  hostile 
and  dangerous,  to  such  a  form  of  govern- 
ment. Time  is  yet  important  to  our 
country  to  settle  and  mature  its  recent 
institutions.  Above  all,  it  appeared  to 
the  undersigned  from  signs  not  to  be 
mistaken,  that  if  wc  entered  upon  this 
war,  we  did  it  as  a  divided  people;  not 
only  from  a  sense  of  the  inadequacy  of 
our  means  to  success,  but  from  nionvl  and 
political  objections  of  great  wciglit  and 
very  general  influence. 

It  appears  to  the  undersigned,  that  tlie 
wrongs,  of  which  the  U.  Suites  have  to 

•  Washinglon. 


complain,  although  in  some  aspects,  very 
grievous  to  our  interests,  and  in  many 
humiliating  to   our  pride,  were  yet  of  a 
nature  which  in  the  present  state   of  the 
world,  either  would  not  justify  war,  or 
jvhich   war  would   not  remedy.    Thus, 
f(ir  instance  the  hovering  of  British  ves- 
sels upon  our  coasts,  and  the  occasional 
insults  to  our  ports,  imperiously  deman- 
ded such  a  systemaiick  application  of  har? 
hour  and  seacoast  defence,  as  would  re- 
pel   such   aggressions;    but  in  no  light, 
can  they  bo   considered  as  making  a  re- 
sort to  war,  at  the  present  time,  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States,  either  necessary 
or  expedient.     So  also,  with  respect  to 
the  Indian  war,  of  the  origin  of  which, 
but  very  imperfect   iniformation  has  as 
yet  been  given  to  the  p  iblick.     Without 
any  express  act  of  Congress,  an  expcdi 
tion    was   last   year,    set  on    foot    and 
prosecuted  into   Indian  lerritory,  whicli 
i>ad  been   relinquished  by  treaty,  on  ths 
part   of  the   United  Stales.     And   now 
we  are  told  about  the  agency  of  British 
traders,  as  to  Indian  hosiijitics.     It  de- 
serves consideration,  whether  there  has 
been  siich  provident  attention,  as  would 
have   been  proper  to  remove  any  cause 
of  complaint,  either  real  or   imaginary, 
which  the  Indians  might  allege,    and  to 
secure  their  friendship.     With    all   the 
sympathy  and    anxiety   excited    by  the 
state   of  that   frontier;  important   as    it 
may  be,  to  appiy  adequate  means  o(  pro- 
tection, against  the  Indians,  how   is  its 
safely  ensured  hy  a   deciaralion   of  war, 
which  adds  the  lirilish  to  the  number  of 
enemies  ? 

As  "  a  decent  respect  to  the  opinions 
of  mankind"  has  not  induced  the  two 
houses  of  congress  to  concur  in  declar- 
ing the  reasons,  or  motives,  for  tlieir 
«;nacling  a  declaration  of  war,  the  under- 
signed and  he.  pnblick  are  left  ro  search, 
elsewhere,  f  )r  causes  either  real,  or  os- 
tensible. If  we  arc  to  consider  tlie  pre- 
sident of  Use  United  States,  and  the  com- 
nuitee  of  the  house  of  representatives, 
on  foreign  relations,  as  speaking  on  this 
solemn  occasion,  for  congress,  the  Uni- 
ted States  have  three  principal  tonicks  CX 


eomplaint  ag^aintt  Great  Britain.  Im- 
presamenta;— >blockadeii— Huid  ordera  in 
council. 

Concerning  the  aubjeet  of  impresa* 
menta,  the  underaigned  sympathize  with 
our  unfortunate  aeamen,  the  victima  of 
this  abuse  of  power,  and  participate  in 
the  national  sensibility,  on  their  account. 
They  do  not  conceal  from  themselves* 
both  its  importance  and  its  difficulty;  and 
they  are  well  aware  how  stubborn  is 
the  will  and  how  blind  the  vision  of  pow 
erful  nations,  when  great  interests  grow 
into  controversy. 

But,  before  a  resort  to  war  for  such 
interests,  a  monil  nation  will  consider 
what  is  just,  and  a  wise  nation  what  is 
expedient.  If  the  exercise  of  any  right 
to  the  full  extent  of  its  abstract  nature, 
be  inconsistent  with  the  safety  of  another 
nation,  morsiity  seems  to  require  that, 
in  practice,  its  exercise  should,  in  this 
respect,  be  modified.  If  it  be  proposed 
to  vindicate  any  right  by  war,  wisdom 
dem  mis  that  it  should  be  of  a  nature, 
by  war  to  be  obtained.  The  interests 
connected  with  the  subjects  of  impress* 
ments  are  unquestionably  great  to  both 
nations;  and  in  the  full  extent  ot  abstract 
right  as  asserted  by  each,  perhaps  irre- 
concilable. 

The  govrrnmcnt  of  the  United  States 
asserts  the  brf>ad  principle,  that  the  flag 
of  their  merchant  vessels  shall  protect 
the  mariners.  This  privilege  is  claim- 
ed, allliouj^h  every  person  on  board,  ex- 
cept the  raptain,  nuiy  he  an  alien. 

The  British  Rovcrnment  asserts  that 
the  allegiance  of  ih-jir  subjects  is  ina- 
lienable, in  time  of  war,  and  that  their 
seamen,  foun*.!  on  the  sea,  the  common 
highway  of  natiniis,  shall  not  be  protect- 
ed by  the  Rug  of  private  merchant  vessels. 

The  undersiirncd  deem  it  unnecessary 
here  to  discuss  the  question  of  the  A- 
merican  rlnim,  for  the  inimtinity  of  tlicir 
flag.  Bull  h<'y  cannot  refrain  from  view- 
ing it  as  tt  principle,  of  a  nature  very 
broad  and  mniprehensive,  to  the  abuse 
of  which  the  leniptnlions  are  strong  and 
numerous.  And  they  do  maintain  that, 
before  the  calamities  of  war, 'in  vindica- 


tion 0f  auch  &  principle  be  incurred,  all 
the  means  of  negotiation  should  be  ex* 
hausted,  and  that  also  every  practicable 
attempt  should  be  made  to  regulate  the 
exercise  of  the  right;  so  that  the  ackntfir* 
ledged  injury,  resulting  to  other  national 
ahould  be  checked,  if  not  prevented; 
They  are  clearly  of  opinion  that  the 
peace  of  thia  happy  and  riaine  commuid^ 
ty  ahould  not  be  abandoned,  for  the  aake 
of  affording  facilities  to  cover  ^reneh 
property;  or  to  employ  British  seamen. 

The  claim  of  Great  Britain  to  the  8er« 
vices  of  her  seamen  is  neither  novel  nor 
peculiar.  The  doctrine  of  allegiance^ 
for  which  she  contends  is  common  to  all 
the  governments  of  Europe.  France, 
as  well  as  England,  has  maintained  it 
fpr  centuries.  Both  nations  claim,  in 
time  of  war,  the  services  of  their  aub- 
jetts.  Both  by  decrees  forbid  their  en- 
tering into  foreign  employ.  Both  recall 
them  by  proclamation. 

No  Ttian  can  doubt  that,  in  the  pre- 
sent state  of  the  French  marine,  if  Ame* 
rican  merchant  vessels  were  met  at  aea, 
having  French  seamen  on  board,  France 
would  take  them.  Will  any  man  believe 
that  the  United  States  would  go  to  war 
against  France,  on  this  account  1 

For  very  obvious  reasons,  this  prifici* 
pie  occasions  little  collision  with  France, 
or  with  any  other  nation,  except  Eng- 
land. With  the  English  nation,  the 
people  of  the  United  States  are  closely 
assimilated,  in  blood,  language,  inter- 
course, habits,  dress,  manners,  and  cha- 
racter. When  Britain  is  at  war  and  the 
United  Siates  neutral,  the  merchant  ser- 
vice of  the  United  States  holds  out  to 
British  seamen,  temptations  almost  irre- 
sistible ; — high  wages  and  peaceful  em^ 
ploy;  instead  of  low  wages  and  war  ser- 
vice ; — safety,  in  lieu  of  hazard  ; — entire 
independence  in  the  place  of  qualified 
servitude. 

Thut  England  whose  situation  is  insu- 
lar, who  is  engaged  in  a  war  apparently 
lor  existence,  whose  seamen  are  her  bul- 
wark, should  look  upon  the  effect  of  our 
principle  upon  her  safety  with  jealousy 
is    inevitable;  and  that  she  will  not  haz- 


irredf  all 
d  be  ex' 
■•cticabltt 
ulAte  thtt 
lacknmr* 
irmatiobti 
revented; 
I  thftt  the 
lommuid' 
'  the  sake 
r  ^reneh 
seamen. 
0  the  8er« 
novel  nor 
Uegiance^ 
mon  to  all 
France) 
ntained  it 
clalm>  in 
their  sub- 
their  cn- 
iotb  recall 

the  pre- 
J,  if  Ame* 
net  at  seat 
rd,  France 
an  believe 
go  to  war 
It? 

us  priOci« 
h  France, 
;ept  Eng« 
tion,  the 
re  closely 
KC,  inter- 
and  cha- 
ser and  the 
chant  ser- 
ds  out  to 
most  irre- 
ceful  em- 
1  war  ser- 
; — entire 
qualified 

mis  insu* 
ipparentljr 
her  bul- 
ect  of  CUP 
jealousy 
1  not  haz- 


ard the  praetical  consequences  of  its 
unrei^uiated  exercise  is  certain.  TIm 
question,  therefore,  presented)  directly, 
lor  the  decision  4)f  the  thoughtful  and 
virtuous  mind,  in  this  country,  is — whe- 
ther war,  for  such  an  abstract  right  be 
justifiable,  before  attempting  to  guard 
against  its  injurious  tendency  by  legis- 
lative regulation,  in  failure  of  treaty. 

A  dubious  right  should  be  advanced 
wit  hesitatbn.  An  extreme  right  should 
be  asserted  with  discretion.  Moral  duty 
requires  that  a  nation,  before  ii  appeals 
to  arms,  should  have  been  not  only  true 
to  itself^  but  that  it  should  have  failed  in 
no  dut^  to  oilers.  If  the  exercise  of  a 
right,  m  an  unregulated  manner,  be  in 
effect,  a  standing  invitation  to  the  sub- 
jects of  a  foreign  power  to  become  de- 
eerters  and  trutors,  is  it  no  injury  to  that 
power? 

Certainly  moral  obligation  demands 
that  the  right  of  flag,  like  all  other  hu- 
man rights,  should  be  so  used,  as  that, 
irliile  it  protects  what  is  our  own,  it 
should  not  injure  what  is  another's.  In 
»  pracdcal  view,  and  so  long  as  the  right 
of  flag  is  restrained,  by  no  regard  to  the 
indeniable  interests  of  others,  a  war,  on 
count  of  impressments,  is  only  a  war 
the  right  of  employing  British  sea- 
en  rni  board  American  merchant  vessels. 
The  claim  of  Great  Britain  pretends 
no  further  extent  than  to  take  Bricish 
amen  from  private  merchant  vessels, 
the  exercise  of  this  claim,  her  officers 
ke  American  seamen,  and  foreign  sea- 
en,  in  the  American  service;  and  al- 
ugh  she  disclaims  such  abuses,  and 
ffers  redress,  when  known,  yet  un- 
ubtedly  grievous  bjuries  have  resulted 
the  seamen  of  the  United  States.  But 
question  is:  Can  war  be  proper  for 
h  cause,  before|all  hope  of  reasonable 
commodation  has  failed?  Even  after  the 
tinguishment  of  such  hope,  can  it  be 
per  until  our  own  practice  be  so  re- 
lated as  to  remove,  in  such  foreign 
Uon,  any  reasonable  apprehension  of 
ury? 

''he  undersigned  are  clearly  of  opi- 
that  the  employment  of  British  sea- 


men, in  the  merchants*  service  of  the  U. 
Spates,  is  as  little  reconcilable  with  the 
permanent  as  the  present  interest  of  the 
United  States.  The  encouragement  of 
foreign  seamen  is  the  discouragement  of 
the  native  American. 

The  duty  of  government  towards  (his 
valuable  class  of  men  is  nut  only  to  pro- 
tect  but  to  p&ironize  thrm.  And  this 
cannot  be  done  more  e{fe«.  tually  than  by 
securing  to  American  citizens  the  privi- 
leges of  American  navigation. 

The  question  of  impressment,  like' 
every  other  question  relative  to  com- 
merce, has  been  treated  in  such  a  man- 
ner, that  what  was  possessed  is  lost  with- 
out obtaining  what  was  sought.  Pre- 
tensions, right  in  theoiy,  and  important 
in  interest,  urged,  without  due  conside- 
ration of  our  relative  power,  have  even- 
tuated in  a  practical  abandonment,  both 
of  what  we  hoped  and  what  we  enjoyed. 
In  attempting  to  spread  our  flag  over  fo- 
reigners, its  distinctive  character  has 
been  lost  to  our  own  citizens, 

The  American  seaman,  whose  interest 
it  is  to  have  no  competitors  in  his  em- 
ployment, is  sacrificed,  that  Britisii  sea- 
men may  have  equal  privileges  with 
himself. 

Ever  since  the  U.  States  have  been  a 
nation,  this  subject  has  been  a  matter  ot 
complaint  and  negotiation;  and  every 
former  administration  have  treated  it,  ac- 
cording to  its  obvious  nature,  as  a  sub- 
ject rather  for  arrangement  than  for  war. 
It  existed  in  the  time  of  Washington; 
yet  this  father  of  his  country  recom- 
mended no  such  resort.  It  existed  in  the 
time  of  Adams;  yet  notwithstanding  the 
zeal  in  suppor  t  of  our  maritime  rights 
wh'xh  distinguished  his  administration, 
wa^^  was  never  suggested  by  him  as  the 
remedy.  During  the  eight  years  Mr. 
JefTereoii  Svood  at  the  helm  of  affairs,  it 
still  continued  a  subject  ol  controversy 
and  negotiation:  but  it  was  never  made 
a  cause  for  war.  It  was  reserved  for 
the  present  administration  to  press  this 
topick  to  the  extreme  and  most  dreadful 
resort  of  nations;  although  England  has 
ofiicially  disavowed  the  right  qjT  impress- 


.! 


*•. 


»■    * 


/''jitiiimt'  • 


^ 


8 


xnent  as  it  respects  native  citizens,  and 
an  arrangement  might  well  be  made 
consistent  with  the  fuir  pretensions  of 
such  as  are  naturalized. 

That  the  real  state  of  this  question 
may  be  understood,  the  undersigned  re- 
cur to  the  followini;  facts  as  supported 
by  official  documents.     Mr.  Kin^,  when 


the  right  of  our  Jtagi  lord  Jfaivktbury 
having  agreed  to  prohibit  ittt/ireatnientt 
on  the  *  high  $eaa,'  and  lord  St.  Vincents 
requiring  nothing  more  than  an  excep* 
tion  of  the  narrow  seat«  un  exception 
resting  on  the  obsolete  claim  6f  O.  Bri- 
tain to  some  peculiar  dominion  over 
them."    Here  then  we  have  a  (till  ac- 


minister  in  Eygland,  obtained  a  disavow-  knowledgmcnt  that  G.  Oritain  was  wil- 
al  of  the  British  government  of  the  right  ling  to  renounce  the  right  of  Impress- 
to  impress  American  seamen,  naturalized  ment  on  the  high  seas  in  fiivour  of  our 
as  well  as  native,  on  the  high  seas.  An  flag;  that  she  was  anxious  to  arrange  tho 
arrangement  had  advanced  nearly  to  a  subject. 

conclusion  upon  this  basis,  and  was  bro-  It  further  appears  that  the  nritish  mi- 
ken  off  only  because  G.  Britain  insisted  nistry    called    for    an    interview    with 
to  retain  tho  right  on  the  narrow  seas.  Messrs.  Monroe  and  Pinkneyi  on  thlii 
What,  however,  was  the  opinion  of  the  topick;  that  they  stated  the  nature  %{ tho 
American  minister  on  the  probability  of  claim,  the  king's  prerogative:  that  they 
an  arrangement  appears  from  the  publick  had  consulted  the  crown  oRtcers  and  the 
documents  comn«unlcated  to  congress  in  board  of  admirjiUyt  who  all  concurred  in 
in  the  session  of  1808,  as  stated  by  Mr.  sentiment,  that  under  the  circumstancea 
Madison,  in  tlicsc  words:  '«  At  the  mo  of  the  nation,  the  relinquishment  of  the 
ment  the  articles  were  expected  to  be  right  was  a  measurot  which  tho  govern* 
blgne'',  u;^  exception  of*  the  narrow  seas*  ment  could  not  adr,/t,  without  taking  on 
wus  urged  and   insisted  on  by  lord  St.  itself  a  responsiuitiLy,  which  no  minmry 
Vincents,  and  being  utterly  inadmissible  would  br  'vilUng  to  meet,  however  press- 
on  our  pari",  the  negotiation  was  aban-  ing  the  exigency  might  be.    They  oflTer^ 
doned."  ed,  however,  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain, 
Mr.   Kin^   seems   to   be  of  opinion,  to  pass  laws  making  it  penal  for  Britlsli 
howevei-,  thut ''  with  more  time  than  was  commanders  to  impress  American  citU 
left  him  for  the  experiment,  the  objec-  zens,  on  board  of  American   vesselsi  on 
tion  might  have  lieen  overcome."  What  the  high  seas,   if  America  would  paSs  a 
time  was  left  Mr.  King  for  the  experi-  law,  making  it  penal   tor  the  officers  of 
ment,  or  whether  any  was  ever  made,  has  the  United  States  to  grant  certificates  of 
not  been  disclosed  to  tlie  publick.     Mr.  citizenship    to   British    subjects;    This 


King,  soon  aftei"  returned  "lo  America- 
It  is  manifest  from  Mr.  King's  expres- 
sion that  he  was  limited  in  point  of  time, 
und  it  is  equally  clear  that  his  opinion, 
was,  that  an  adjustment  could  take  place 
That  Mr.  Madison  was  also  of  the  same 
opinion  is  demonstrated  by  his  letters  to 


r 


will  be  found,  in  the  same  documents,  in 
a  letter  from  Messrs.  Monroe  and  Pink* 
ney  to  Mr.  Madison,  dated  1 1th  Novem- 
ber, 1 806.  Under  their  peremptory  in- 
structions, this  proposition,  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain,  could  not  be  acceded  to  by 
our  ministers.     Such,1iowever,  was  the 


Messrs.  Monroe  and  Pinkney,  dated  the  temper  and  anxiety  of  England,  and  iiich 

3d  of  February,  1 807,  in  which  he  uses  the  candour  and  good  sense  of  our  mi- 

-  these  expressions:  "  I  take  it  for  grant-  nisters,  that   an  honourable  and  advan- 

ed  that  you  have  not  failed  to  make  due  tageou»  arrangement  did  takefilace.  The 

use  of  the   arrangement  concerted  by  authority  of  Mr.  Monroe,  then  minister 

Mr.  King  with  lorci  Hawksbury  in  the  at  the  court  of  Great  Britain,  npw  secre- 

year    1802,  for  settling  the  question  of  tary^of  state^  and  one  of  the  present  ad« 

■  impressment.     On  that  occasion,  and  un-  ministration,  who    have    recemmehded 

dcr  that  adniiniatrationt  the  British  firin-  war  with  England,  and  assigned  imbr^sB- 

lijile  was  fairly  renounced  in  favour  of  ments  as  a  cause,  s\itppo;ts  theutlder* 


t 


»•  ♦ 


f  * 


Itaivkabury 

i/irta»Hient!t 

t.  Vincents 

an  exc«p' 

exception 

6f  O.  Bri. 

linion  ovei* 

a  foil  ac- 

ill  was  wil- 

f  impress. 

irour  of  our 

irrango  the 

British  mU 
•view    wHIi 
BXi  on  tliiii 
iture  ttf  the 
:  tliat  they 
:ers  and  the 
oncurred  in 
cumstances 
nent  of  the 
the  govern* 
t  taking  on 
no  minmry 
rever  press- 
They  offer- 
eat  Britain, 
for  Britisli 
erican  citi- 
vessels,  on 
ould  pats  a 
e  oflicers  of 
irtificates  of 
ects.    This 
cuments,  in 
i  and  Pink<* 
th  Novem- 
smptory  in- 
k  the  part  of 
ceded  to  by 
er,  was  the 
d>andsuch 
of  our  mi- 
ttnd  advari' 
fiiace.  The 
n  minister 
npw  secre- 
prcseiitad- 
ornmehded 
d  impress- 
the-uiKler« 


» 


9 


f  •^ 


signed  in  asserting^,  that  it  was  honour-  mislead.     An  importance  is  attached  to 

able    and  advuntagaotis:  fur  in  a   letter  it,  nfwitich,  in  the  opinion  of  the  .under- 

from  Richmond  cJutud  tho  2Uth  of  Feb-  signed,  it  is  not  worthy.     Let  the  lactt 

t*uary,  1808,  to  Mr.  Madison,  the  friluw-  apuuk  fur  themnclvcH. 
iiig  espresHions  are  used  by  Mr.  Mon-        In  Aup^.  1804,  the  British  established 

roe:  "  I  have,  on  the  contrary  always  be-  u  blockade  at  the  entrance  of  the  French 

lieved  and  still  do  believe  that  the  ground  ports,  naming  them,  frum  Fccam'>  to  Os- 

on  which  that  interest  [impressment]  was  tend;   and   tVom  their   proximity  to  tho 

placed  by  the  paper  oT  tho  British  com-  British    coasts,  and  the  absence  of  all 

missionors  of  8th    November,  1806,  and  complaint,  we  may  be  permitted  to  be- 

the  explanation  which  accompanied    it,  licvc  that  it   was  a  legal   blockade,   en* 

ivaa  boihliononrable  and  advantageouH  to  forced  accordinj^  to  the  usages  of  nations. 

the  United  i'/a/^*,  that  it  contained  a  con-  On  thw  16th  ol  May,   1806,  the  English 

cession  in   their  favour  on  the  part   of  secretary  of  state,  Mr.  Fox,  notified  to 

Great  Britain,  on  the  great  principle  in  our  minister  at  London,  that  his  govern- 

contcstation,   never  before    made    by  a  menl  had  thought  fit  to  direct  necessary 


formal  and  obligatory  act  of  their  govern 
incnt,    whic'       as   highly   favourable  to 
their  interest.' 

With  the  opiiion  of  Mr.  King  so  de- 
cidedly cniessed;  with  the  official  ad- 
mission '■  Mr.  Maclibon;  with  the  ex- 
plicit declaratioi   of  Mr.  Monrou,  all  con 


mcamres  to  be  taken  lor  the  blockade  of 
the  ooasts,  rivers  and  ports,  from  the 
river  Elbe  to  the  river  Brest,  both  in- 
clusive.* 

In  point  of  tact,  as  the  termn  used  in 
the  order  will  show,  this  paper,  which 
has  become  a  aubstantivc  and   avowed 


curring  that  Ciri't  Britain  was  ready  to    cause  for  non  intercourse,  embargo  and 


abandon  imprciisment  on  the  high  seas, 
and  with  'an  iionourable  and  advantage- 
ous arrtmgement:,  actually  made  by  Mr. 
Monroe,  hivw  can  it  be  pretended,  that  all 
hope  of  settlement,  by  treaty,  hat>  iuiledf 
how  can  this  subjccc  furnish  u  proper 
cause  of  war? 


war,  is  a  blockade,  only  of  the  places,  on 
the  French  coast,  from  Ostend  lo  the 
Seine,  and  even  as  to  these  it  is,  merely, 
as  it  professes  to  be,  a  continuance  ol  a 
former  and  existing  blockade  For  with 
respect  to  the  residue  nf  the  coast,  irado 
of  neutrals  is  admitted,  with  the  cxcep. 


With  respect  to  the  subject  of  block-    tion  only,  of  enemy's  property  and  arli- 


ades;  the  principle  dl'the  law  ol' nations, 
as  asserted  by  the  U.  States,  is,  thi\t  a 
blockade  can  only  be  justified  when  sup- 
ported by  an  adequate  force.  In  theory 
Uhis  principle  is  admitted  by  Great  liri- 
ftain.  It  is  alleged,  however,  tiiat  in 
practice  she  disregalds  that  principle. 

The  order  of  blockade,  which  has  been 
'made  u  spccificklground  ot  complaint  by 
Ftance,  is  that  of  the  16th  of  May  1806. 
Yet,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  this  order, 
which  is,  now,  made  one  ground  of  war 
between  the  two  countries,  was,  at  the 
time  of  its  first  issuing,  viewed  as  an  act 
of  favour  and  conciliation.  On  this  sub- 
ject it  is  necessary  to  be  explicit.  The 
vague  and  indeterminate  manner,  in 
which  the  American  and  French  govern- 
ments, in  their  official  papers,  spcuk  of 
this  order  of  blockade,   is   calculated  tp 


clei  contraband  of  war,  wljich  :\re  liable 
to  be  taken,  -vithout  a  blockade;' and  ex- 
cept the  direct  colonial  trade  of  the  ene- 
my, which  Great   Britain    denied  to  ba 

*  The  ttii'iiis  of  tlic  order  arc  these:  "  That 
ll>e  said  coast,  rivers  and  ports  niiist  be  consi- 
dered us  blockiuled,"  but,  "that  such  block- 
ade shall  nut  extend  to  prevent  neutral  ships 
and  vessels,  laden  with  goods,  not  beinjf  the  pro- 
perty (){  his  majesty's  enemies,  and  not  being; 
contrubaiul  of  war  from  approaching  the  said 
coasts  and  entering  into  iiud  sailing  from  thu 
said  rivers  and  pons  save  and  except  the  coast- 
rivers  and  ports  from  Ostcnd  to  tiie  river  S'iine, 
already  in  a  state  of  strict  and  rigorous  bluclt- 
ade;  and  which  are  to  be  considered  as  so  con- 
tinued," with  a  proviso  tliat  the  vessels  enter, 
ing  had  not  been  laden  at  a  port  belonging  to, 
or  in  possession  of,  the  enemies ,of  (J.  Hritain, 
and  the  vessels  departing  were  not  desliued  ti; 
an  enemy  port,  or  had  previously  broken  blocs- 
adc." 


mm 


•  y 


«  •  *^   *'>^» 


10 


free  by  the  law  of  nations.  Why  the  or-  blockade  of  the  coast  from  Seine  to  Os- 
tler was  thus  extended,  in  its  form,  while  tend."  «  The  object  was  to  afford  to  the 
in  effect  it  added  nothing  to  orders  and  U.  States  an  accommodation  respectii^g  , 
regulations,  already  existing,  will  be  the  colonial  trade." 
known  by  adverting  to  papers  which  are  It  appears,  then,  that  thi»^order  was  in 
before  the  world.  In  1806.  France  had  point  of  fact,  madie  to  favour  our  trade 
yet  colonies,  and  the  wound  indicted  on  and  was  so  understood  and  admitteed  by 
our  feelings,  by  the  interference  of  the  the  government  of  this  country,  at  that 
British   goveriunent   in  our  trade  with  time  and  since;  that,  instead  of  extend- 


ing prior  blockades  it  lessened  them: 
that  the  country  from  Seine  to  Brest, 
and  from  Ostend  to  Elbe  was  inserted 
to  open  them  to  our  colonial  trade  and 
for  our  accommodation,  and  that  it  was 


those  colonies,  had  been  the  cause  of  re- 
monstrance  and  negotiation.  At  the  mo- 
ment when  the  order  of  may  1 806,  was 
made,  Mr.  Monroe,  the  present  secreta- 
ry of  state,  then  our  minister  plenipoten- 

.  tiary  at  the  court  of  Great  Britain,  was    never  made  the  subject  of  complaint,  by 

^  ill   treaty  on  the  subject  of  the  carrying    the    American   government,   during  its 

"trade,  and  judging  on  the  spot,  and  at  the    practical  continuance;  that  is;  not  until 

time,  he  unl^esitatingly  gave  his  opinion,    the  first  order  in  council;  and  indeed,  not 

thai  the  order  was  made  to  favour  Ame-    until    after  the   first  of  May   1810;  and 

rican  views  and  interests.    This  iuea  is    until  alter  the  American  government  was 

Unequivocallv  expressed,  in   Mr.  Mon-    apprised  of  the  ground,  which  it  was  the 

Toe'b  icuers  to  Mr.  Madison  of  the  17th,    will  of  France  should  be  taken  upon  the 

-  antl  20th*  of  May,  and  of  the  9th  of  June, 

18^6. 

•'^      And  as  late  as  October,  181 1,  the  same 

gentleman,  writing  as  secretarj^  of  state 

*  to  the  British  miriisler,  speaking  of  the 

^  same  order  of  blockade  of  May,   1806, 

says:   "  It  strictly  was  little  more  thaii  a 


I 


'  Tiie  following  aiv  ixiracts  from  these  let- 
ters    In  that  of  the  17t\i  May   1806,  he  thus 
spe&ks  of  that   blockade.    It  is  "  couched  in 
terms  of  restraint,  and  professes  to  extend  the 
blockade   fuither  tlun    was  lieretofore  done. 
nevertheless,  it  tahe4,it  from  many  borta  already 
blockaded,  indeed,  from  all  East  ot  Ostend,  and 
West  of  the  Seine,  except  in  articles  contra- 
band of  war  and  enemies  property,  which  are 
BCizablc  without  blockade.     And  in  like  form 
of  exception,  considering  every  enemy  as  one 
power,  it  admits  the  trade  ot  neutrals,  within 
the  same  limits,  to  be  free  in  the  productions 
of  enemies  colonies,  in  every,  but  the  direct 
route  between  the  colony  and  tlie  parent  coun- 
try. '     .^^r.  Monroe  adds:  "  It  cannot  be  doubt- 
ed that  the  note  was  drawn  by  the  government, 
in  reference  to  tlie  question,  and  if  intc^ided  as 
the  foundalion  of  a  treaty,  must  be  viewed  in  a 
very  favourable  light."  On  the  20th  of  May,  .Mr. 
Monroe  writes  to    Mr    Madison,  that  lie  liad 
been  "strengthened  in   the  opinion   tliat  the 
order  of  the  16th  was  drawn  witli  a  view  tc  ^hc 
question  of  our  trade  with  enemies  colonies, 
and  that  ii  promises  to  be  highly  satisfactory  to 
oui"  comma'cial  intwests." 


subject. 

Of  this  we   have   the  most  decisive 
proof  in  the  offers   made  under  the  ad- 
ministration  of  Mr.   Jefferson,   for  the 
discontinuance  of  the  embargo  as  it  re- 
lated to  Great  Britain;  none  of  which  re- 
quired the  repeal  of  the  blockade  of  May 
1806;  and  also  in  the  arrangement  made 
during  the  administration  of  Mr.  M.idi- 
son,  and  under  his  eye  with  Mr.  Erskine. 
The  non  intercourse  act  of  March  1809, 
and  the  act  «  concerning  commercial  in- 
tercourse." of  May  1810,  vest  the  presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  with  the  very 
same   power,  in  the   very  same  terms. 
Both    authorize  him  «'  ir  case  either  G. 
Britain  or  France  shall  so  revoke  or  mo- 
dify her  edicts,  as  that  they  shall  cease 
to  violate  the  neutral  commerce  of  the 
United  States,"   to  declare  the  same  by 
proclamation.    And,  by  the  provisions  of 
one  law  in  such  case,  uon  intercourse  was 
to  cease;  by  those  of  the  other  it  was  to 
be  revived.     In  consequence   of  power 
vested,  by  the  first  act,  the  arrangement 
with  Erskine  was  matle  and  the  revoca- 
tion of  the  orders  in  council  of  January 
and  November  1807,  was  considered  as 
a  full  compliance  with  the  law   and  as 
rcir.oving  all  the,  anii-ncutral  edicts.— 


V  .^^jbtfiib^Jlllf*^' 


il.ia*i^ 


a 


m 


« 


Seine  to  Os> 
ifford  to  the 
respecting 

>rder  was  in 
p  our  trade 
dmitteed  by 
itry,  at  that 

of  extend- 
lened  them: 
e  to  Brest, 
vas  inserted 
1  trade  and 

that  it  was 
>mplaint,  by 

during  its 
is;  noi  until 

indeed,  not 
'  1810;  and 
rnment  was 
h  it  was  the 
in  upon  the 

>st  decisive 
ier  the  ad- 
for  the 
re- 
)f  which  re- 
Lade  of  May 
iment  made 
Mr.  M.idi- 
[r.  Erskine. 
ilarch  1809, 
imercial  in- 
t  the  presi- 
th  the  very 
ime  terms, 
le  either  G. 
oke  or  mo- 
ihali  cease 
rce  of  the 
le  same  by 
•ovisions  of 
course  was 
r  it  was  to 
:   of  power 
rangcraent 
the  rcvoca- 
of  January 
jsidercd  as 
tw   and  as 
i  edicts.—M 


:^n 


JO  as  It 


Tlieblockadrf  of  May  1806,  was  not  in- 
cluded in  the  arrangement,  and  it  does 
not  appear,  that  it  was  dcemcu  of  suBi- 
cient  importance  to  engage  even  a 
thought.  Yet  under  the  act  of  May, 
1810,  which  vests  the  very  same  power, 
a  revocation  of  this  blockade  of  May 
1806,  is  made  by  our  cabinet  a  sine  qua 
non;  an  indispensible  requisite!  And  now 
after  the  British  minister  has  directly 
avowed  that  this  order  of  blockade  would 
not  continue  after  a  revocation  of  the 
orders  in  council,  without  a  due  applica* 
lion  of  an  adequate  iorce,  the  existence 
of  this  blockade  is  insisted  upon,  as  a 
justifiable  cause  of  war,  notwithstanding, 
that  our  government  admits  a  blockade 
is  legal,  to  the  maintenance  of  whish  an 
adequate  force  is  applied. 

The  undersigned  are  aware  that  in 
justification  of  this  new  ground,  it  is 
now  said  that  the  extension  on  paper.;  for 
whatever  purpose  intended,  favours  the 
principle  of  paper  blockades.  This  how- 
ever, can  hardly   be   urged,  since  the 


able  in  the  principle  of  the  order  of 
May  1806,  or  in  the  practice  under  it« 
on  ground  merely  Amcucan,  it  cannot 
be  set  up  as  a  sufficient  cause  of  war; 
for  until  France  pointed  it  out  as  a  cause 
of  controversy,  it  was  so  far  fro^^  being 
regarded  as  a  source  of  any  new  or 
grievous  complaint,  that  it  was  actually 
considered  by  our  government  in  a  Ta- 
vourable  light. 

The  British  orders  in  council  are  the 
remaining  source  of  discontent,  and 
avowed  cause  of  war.  These  have  here- 
tofore been  considered  by  our  govern- 
ment in  cotmexion  with  the  French  de- 
crees. Certainly  the  British  orders  in 
council  and  French  decrees  form  a  sys- 
tem subversive  of  neutral  rights  and  con- 
stitute just  grounds  of  complaint,  yet, 
viewed  relatively  to  the  condition  of 
those  powers  towards  each  other,  and 
of  the  United  States  towards  both,  the 
undersigned  cannot  persuade  themselves 
that  the  orders  in  council  as  they  now 
exist  and  with  their  present  effect  and 


British*  formally  disavow  the  principle;    operation,  justify  the   selection  of  Great 


and  since  they  acknowledge  the  very 
doctrine  of  the  law  of  nacions  for  which 
the  American  administration  contend, 
henceforth  the  existence  of  a  blockade 
becomes  a  question  of  fact:  it  must  de- 
pend upon  the  evidence  adduced  in  sup- 
port ot  the  adequacy  of  the  blockading 
force. 

From  the  preceding  statement  it  is  ap 


Britain  as  our  enemy,  and  render  ne- 
cessary a  declaration  .>f  unqualified  war. 
Every  consideration  of  moral  duty,  and 
political  expedignce  seems  to  concur  in 
Warning  the  United  States,  not  to  min- 
gle in  this  hopeless  and,  to  humai  eye, 
interminable  European  contest.  Neither 
France  nor  England  pretends  that  their 
agtrressions   can  be    defended    on   the 


parent  that  whatever  there  is  objection-    ground  of  any   other  belligerent   right 

than  that  of  particular  necessity. 

Both  attempt  to  justify  their  encroach- 
ments on  the  general  law  of  nations  by 
the  plea  of  retaliation.  In  the  relative 
position  and  proportion  of  strength  of  the 
United  States  to  either  belligerent,  there 
appeared  little  probability  that  we  could 
compel  the  one  or  the  other,  by  hostile 
opevalions,  to  abandon  this  plea. 

And  as  the  field  of  coi  mercial  enter- 
prise, after  allowing  to  the  decrees  and 
orders  tlicir  full  practical  effect,  is  still 
rich  and  extensive,  there  seemed  as  iittle 
wisdom  as  obligation  to  yield  solid  and 
certain  realities  lor  unattainable  prctcn* 
ions.  The  right  uf  retaliation,  as  exists 
s 


•  Mr.  Foster  in  his  letter  of  the  3d  July  1811, 
to  Mr.  Monroe,  thus  slates  the  doctrine  main, 
tained  by  his  (jovcrnment, 

"Great  Britain  has  never  attempted  to  dis- 
pute that,  in  tl)e  ordinary  course  of  the  law  of 
nations,  no  blockade  can  be  JMstili;ible  or  valid, 
tmless  it  be  supported  by  an  '  adequate  force 
destined  to  maintain  it,  and  to  expose  to  ha- 
zard all  vessels  attempting  to  evade  its  ope- 
ration." 

Mr.  Foster  in  liis  letter  to  Mr.  Monroe  of  the 
26lh  July,  1811,  als,  says:  "  The  blockade  of 
May  1806,  will  not  continue  after  the  repeal  of 
the  orders  in  council,  unless  his  majesty's  go- 
vernment shall  think,  iit  to  sustain  it  by  the 
special  applicaVion  of  a  sufficient  naval  force, 
anil  the  fact  of  its  being  so  continued,  or  not, 
will  be  notifi'.d  at  the  tnne." 


~^|ifr" 


w^mimm 


AfS 


*    • 


Id 


A 


hijg  thckher  belligerfent,  tt  was  impossi- 
ble for  iliP  United  States,  consistent  with 
feitlK  r  its  duty  or  Interest,  to  admit.  Yet 
such   was  the  state  of  the  decrees  and 
Orders  ot  the  respective  belligerents,  in 
relation   to  the  rights  of  neutrals,  that, 
\irhile,  on  the  one  hand,  it  formed  no  jus- 
tification to  either,  so  on  the  other,  con- 
current circumstances  formed    a  com- 
plete justification  to  the  United  Slates 
in   maintaining,   notwithstanding    these 
encroachments,    prol'idcd   it  best  com- 
ported with  their  interests,  that  system 
of  impartial   neutrality,  which  is  so  de- 
sirable to  their  peace  and  prosperity.—. 
For  if  it  should  he  admitted,  which  no 
course  ofargument  ran  maintain,  that  the 
Berlin  decree)  which  was  issued  on  the 
21st  of  November,    1806,  was  justified 
by  the    antecedent   orders  of  the    Bri- 
tish  admiralty,  respecting  the  colonial 
trade,     and     by    the    order    of    block- 
ade of  the   1 6th  of  May,   preceding,  yet 
on  this    account,  there  resulted  no  right 
of  retaliation    to  Francfc,  as  it  respected 
the  United  States.    They  had  expressed 
no  acquiescence    either    in  the   British 
interference   with  the  colonial  trade,  or 
in    any  extension  of  the    principles  of 
blockade.     Besidesi  had  there  been  any 
such  neglect,  on  the   part  of  the  United 
StaiCH,    as  warranted  the  French  empe- 
rour  in  adopting  his  principle  of  retalia- 
tion, yet  in  the  exercise  of  that  preten- 
ded  right,    he    past  the   bounds  of  both 
publick  law  and  decency;  and  in  the  very 
extravagance    of  that    exercise,  lost  the 
advantage  of  whatever  colour  the  British 
had  afforded  to  his  pretences.     Not  con- 
tent with  adopting  a  principle  of  retalityp 
tioni,  in  terms  limited,   ind    appropriate 
to   the   injury  of  which  he  complained, 
he  tleclaved,  "  all  the  British  Islands,  in 
ti  sate   of  blockade;  prohibited  all  com- 
xncrce    and  correspondence  witli  them, 
hII  trade  in  their  manufactures;  and  made 
lawful  prize  of  all  merchandise,  belong- 
ing to  England,  or  coming  from  its  ma 
tiunictories,  and  colonies."  The  violence 
of  these  encroachments  was  ecivialied  only 
by    the  insidiousness  of  the   terms,  and 
manner,  iu  which  they  were  promulga- 


ted. The  scope  of  the  expressions  q# 
tbe  Berlin  decree,  was  so  general  that 
it  embraced  within  its  sphere,  the  whole 
commerce  of  neutrals  with  England. 
Yet  Decres,  Minister  of  the  Marihe  of 
France,  by  a  formal  note,  of  the,  34tU 
December,  1806,  assured  our  minister 
plenipotentiary,  that  the  imperial  decree, 
of  the  2 1  St  November,  1806,  *^  loaa  not 
to  affect  our^  commerce,  which  would  atill 
be  governed  by  the  rules  qf  the  treaty^ 
eatablished  between  the  two  countries." 
Notwithstanding  this  assurance,  howe- 
ver, on  the  18th  September  following 
Regnier  Grand  Minister  of  justice,  de- 
clared "  that  the  intentions  of  the  Emfier- 
our  were  that  by  virtue  of  that  decree 
Frerich  drined  vessels,  might  seize  inneU' 
tral  vessfls,  either  English  firofierty^  o't 
merchandise  firoceeding  from  the  English 
vianiif actor ics;  and  that  he  had  reserved^ 
for  future  decision  the  question  whether 
thpy  might  not  possess  themsetvea  of  neu- 
tral vessels  going  to  or  from  England,  al' 
though  they  had  no  English  manufacturm 
on  board."  Pretentions  se  obviously 
exceeding  any  measure  of  retaliation 
that,  if  the  precedent  acts  of  the  British 
government,  had  afibrded  to  such  a  re- 
sort, any  colour  of  right,  it  was  lost  in 
the  violence,  and  extravagance  of  these 
assumed  principles. 

To  the  Berlin  decree  succeeded  the 
British  orders  in  council,  of  the  7th  of 
January,  1807,  which  were  merged  in 
the  orders  of  the  11th  of  November  fol- 
lowing. These  declared  "  all  ports,  and 
nlaces  belonging  to  France,  and  its  allies^ 
from  which  the  British  flag  was  exclu- 
ded,  all,  in  the  colonies  of  his  Britannick 
majesty's  enemies,  in  a  state  of  block- 
ade;— prohibiting  all  trade,  in  the  pro- 
duce and  manufactures)  of  the  said  coun- 
tries or  colonies;  and  making  all  vessels 
trarling  to  or  from  them,  and  all  mer- 
chandise, on  board  subject  to  capture  and 
condemnation,  with  an  exception,  only  in 
favour  of  the  direct  trade,  between  neu- 
tral countries  and  the  colonies  of  his 
majesty's  enemies." 

These   eraravagant    pretensions,    on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain,  were    imme- 


•  - 


'^l^u 


expressions  of 

general  that 
re,  the  whole 
ith  En^rland. 
lie  Marine  of 
,  of  the,  34th 

our  minister 
perial  decree, 
36,  «  was  not 
c/i  would  still 
qf  the  treaty t 
0  countries,** 
ranee,  howe- 
ler  following 
)f  justice,  de- 
ofthe  Emfier' 
f  that  decree 
'  seize  in  neU' 
property^  oi" 
n  the  English 
had  reservedr 
stion  whether 
lelves  of  next' 

England,  at- 
manufactures 
\%  obviously 
>f  retaliation 
f  the  British 
o  such  a  ro* 

was  lost  in 
nee  of  these 

cceeded  the 
f  the  7th  of 
merged  in 
vember  fol- 
1  ports,  and 
id  its  allies, 
was  exclu> 
Britannick 
of   block- 
in  the  pro- 
said  cnun- 
all  vessels 
all    mer- 
apture  and 
on,  only  in 
ween  neu- 
kics   of  his 

isions,    on 
re    immc- 


13 


diatcly  succeeded  by  others,  slill  more 
extravagant  on  the  part  of  France.-^ 
Without  waiting  for  any  knowledge  of 
the  conrse  the  American  government 
Would  take,  in  relation  to  the  British  or- 
ders in  council,  the  French  Emperour 
issued,  on  the  17th  of  December  follow- 
ing, his  Milan  decree,  by  which  »'  every 
ship  of  whatever  nation,  which  shall  have 
submitted  to  search,  by  an  English  ship, 
or  to  a  voyage  to  England,  or  paid  any 
tax  to  that  government,  are  declared 
denationalized  and  lawful  prize. 

"  The  British  Islands  are  declared  in 
a  state  of  blockade,  by  sea  and  land,  and 
and  every  ship  of  whatever  nation,  or 
whatsover  the  nature  of  its  cargo  may 
be,  that  sails  from  England,  or  those  of 
the  English  colonies,  or  of  countries 
occupied  by  English  troops,  and  pro- 
ceeding to  England,  or  to  the  English 
colonies,  or  to  countries  occupied  by  the 
English,  to  be  good  prize."  The  nature 
rnd^  extent  of  these  -njuries  thus  accu- 
mulated by  mutual  enbrts  of  both  belli- 
gerents, seemed  to  teach  the  American 
statesman  this  important  lesson;  not  to 
attach  the  cuuse  ol'  his  country  to  one, 
or  the  oiner;  but  by  systematick  and  so- 
lid provisions,  for  seacoast  and  mari- 
time  defence,  to  place  its  interests,  as  far 
as  its  situation  and  resources  permits 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  rapacity,  or 
ambition  of  any  European  power.  Happy 
would  it  have  been  for  our  country,  if  a 
course  of  policy,  so  simple  and  obvious, 
bad  been  adopted  ! 

Unfortunately  administration  had  re- 
course to  a  system,  complicated  in  its 
^nature,  and  destructive  in  its  effects: 
■which,  instead  of  relief  from  the  accu- 
mulated injuries  of  foreign  governments, 
served  only  to  fill  up,  what  was  wanting 
in  the  measure  of  evils  abroad,  by  artifi- 
cial embarrassments  at  home.  As  long 
ago  as  the  year  1794;  Mr.  Madison,  the 
present  president  of  the  U  States,  then  a 
member  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
devised  and  proposed  a  system  of  commer- 
cial restrictions,  which  had  for  its  object 
the  coercion  of  Great  Britain,  by  a  denial 
to  her  of  our  products  and  our  market;  as- 


serting that  the  former  was,  in  a  manner 
essential  to  her  prosperity,  either  as  nei» 
cessaries  of  life,  or  as  raw  materials 
for  her  manufactures;  and  that  without 
the  latter,  a  great  proportion  of  her  la- 
bouring classes,  could  not  subsist. 

In  that  day  of  sage  and  virtuous  fore- 
thought, the  proposition  was  rejected. 
It  remained,  however,  a  theme  of  unceas- 
ing panegyrick  among  an  active  class  of 
American  politicians,  who  with  a  syste- 
matick pertinacity  inculcated  among  the 
people,  tliat  commercial  restrictions  were 
a  species  of  warfare,  which  would  ensure 
success  to  ihc  United  Statts,  and  humili- 
tion  to  Great  Britain. 

There  vrcre  two  circumstances,  inhe- 
rent in  this  system  of  coercing  Great 
Britain  by  commerci  ,1  restrictions,  which 
ought  to  have  made  practical  politicians 
very  doubtful  of  its  resvdt,  and  very  cau- 
tious of  its  trial.  These  were  the  state 
of  opinion  in  relation  to  its  efficacy 
among  commercial  men  in  the  United 
States;  and  the  state  of  feeling  which  a 
resort  to  it  would  imavoidably  produce 
in  Great  Britain.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
was  undeniable  that  the  great  body  of 
commercial  men  in  the  United  States 
had  no  belief  in  such  a  dependence  of 
Great  Britain  upon  the  United  States, 
either  for  our  produce  or  our  market,  as 
the  system  implied. 

Without  the  hearty  cooperation  of  this 
class  of  men,  success  in  its  attempt  was 
obviously  unattainable.  And  as  on  them 
the  chief  suffering  would  fall,  it  was  al- 
together unreasonable  to  expect  tliatthey 
would  become  cooperating  instruments 
in  support  of  any  system  which  was  ruin 
to  them  and  without  hope  to  their  cou'p- 
try.  On  the  other  hand,  as  it  respects 
Great  Britain,  a  system  proceeding  upon 
the  avowed  principle  of  her  dependence 
upon  us  was  among  the  last  to  which  a 
proud  and  powerful  nation  would  yield. 

Notwithstanding  these  olivious  consi- 
derations, in  April,  1806,  Mr.  Madison 
being  then  secretary  of  state,  a  law  passed 
congress  prohibiting  the  importation  of 
certain  specified  manufactures  of  Great 
Britain  and  her  dependencies,  on  the  ba- 


fi    n 


14 


.   « 


ti 


sis  of  Mr.  Madison's  origitml  proposi' 
tion.  Thus  the  United  States  entered 
on  the  system  of  commercial  hostility 
against  G.  Britain. 

The  decree  of  Berlin  was  issued  in 
the  ensuing  Novembe"  (1806.)  The 
treaty,  which  had  been  signed  at  London, 
in  December,  1806,  having  been  reject- 
ed by  Mr.  Jefferson  without  being  pre- 
sented to  the  senate  for  ratification,  and 
the  non-importation  at  not  being  repeal- 
ed but  only  suspended,  Great  Britain  is- 
sued her  orders  in  council,  on  the  11th 
November,  1807. 

On  the  21  St  of  the  same  month  of  No- 
vember, Champagny,  French  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  wrote  to  Mr.  Armstrong, 
the  American  minister,  in  the  words  fol- 
lowing: "  All  the  difficulties  which  have 
given  rise  to  your  reclamations,  sir,, 
would  be  removed  with  ease,  if  the  go- 
vernment of  the  United  States,  after 
complaining  in  vain  of  the  injustice  and 
violations  of  England,  took,  with  the 
whole  continent,  the  part  of  guaranty- 
ing it  therefrom." 

On  the  17th  of  the  ensuing  December 
the  Milan  decrees  were  issued  on  the 
part  of  France,  and  five  days  afterwards 
the  embargo  was  passed  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States.  Thus  was  comple- 
ted, by  acts  nearly  cotemporaneous,  the 
circle  of  commercial  hostilities. 

After  an  ineffectual  trial  of  four  years 
to  control  the  policy  of  the  two  belli- 
gerents by  this  system,  it  was,  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States,  for  a  time,  relin- 
quished. The  act  of  the  1st  May,  1810, 
gave  the  auihority,  however,  to  the  pre- 
sident of  the  United  States  to  revive  it 
against  G.  Britaini  i,n  case  France  revo- 
ked her  decrees.  Such  revocation  on 
the  part  of  France  was  declared  by  the 
president's  proclamation  on  the  2d  Nov. 
1810,  and,  in  consequence,  non  inter- 
course was  revived  by  our  administration 
against  G.  Britain. 

At  all  times  the  undersigned  have 
looked  with  much  anxiety  for  the  evi- 
dence of  this  revocation.  They  wished 
not  to  qucstit)n  what,  in  various  forms, 
hasbccn  so  often  asserted  by  the  adminis- 


tration, and  its  agents  by  their  direction. 
But  neither  as  publick  men  nor  as  citizens 
can  they  consent  that  the  peace  and 
prosperity  of  the  country  should  he  sa- 
crificed, in  maintenance  of  a  position, 
which  on  no  principle  of  evidence  they 
deem  tenable.  They  cannot  falsify  or 
conceal  their  conviction  that  the  French 
decrees  neither  have  been  nor  are  rpvo- 
ked. 

Without  pretending  to  occupy  the 
whole  field  of  argument  which  the  ques- 
tion  of  revocation  has  opened,  a  concise 
statement  seems  inseperable  from  the 
occasion. 

The  condition  on  which  the  non  inter- 
course, according  to  the  act  of  1st  May, 
1810,  might  be  revised  against  G.  Britain, 
was,  on  the  part  of  France,  an  effectual 
revocation  of  her  decrees.  What  the 
president  of  the  U.  States  was  bound  to 
require  from  the  French  government  was, 
the  evidence  of  such  effectual  levocdtion. 
Upon  this  point  both  the  right  of  the  U> 
States  and  the  duty  of  the  president  seem 
to  be  resolved  into  very  distinct  and  un- 
deniable principles.  The  object  to  be  ob- 
tained for  the  United  States  from  France 
was,  an  effectual  revocation  of  the  de« 
crees.  A  revocation  to  be  effectual  must 
include,  in  the  nature  of  things,  this  es- 
sential requisite;  the  wrongs  done  to  the 
neutral  commerce  of  the  U.  States,  by  the 
operation  of  the  decrees,  must  be  stop- 
ped. Nothing  short  of  this  could  be  an 
efiectual  revocation. 

Without  reference  to  the  other  wrongs 
resulting  from  those  decrees  to  the  com- 
merce of  the  United  States,  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  state  the  prominent  wrong 
done  by  the  3d  article  of  the  Iviilan  de- 
cree.*   'J  .     nature  of  this  wrong  essen- 


•  This  article  is  in  these  words: 

"  Art.  III.  The  British  islands  arc  declared 
to  be  in  a  state  of  blockade,  both  by  land  and 
sea.  Every  ship  of  whatever  nation,  or  what- 
soever the  nature  of  its  cargo  may  be,  tiiat 
sails  from  the  ports  of  England,  or  those  of  the 
English  colonies  and  of  the  countries  occupied 
by  English  troops  and  proctcding  to  England, 
or  to  the  English  Colonies,  or  to  countries  oc- 
cupied by  En]j;U8h  troops  is  |^ood  aiid  lawftjl 


tial 
Fn 
ma| 
vea 

turf 
It 

voct 

taM 

the{ 

fror 

tain| 

of 

gus| 

in 

it 

whil 

autf 

to  i^ 

seqt 

cafiif 

is  n| 

ture 


'imitMttitSSm0liS^iii*^ 


iiliiiiSi^ 


:^Mlii, 


:*ii*!!fc 


VI 


15 


« 


tially  consisted  in  the  authority  given  lo    by  the  legislature,  on  a  point  so  interest- 


French  ships  of  war  and  privateers  to 
make  prize,  at  sea,  of  every  neutral 
vessel  sailing  to  or  from  any  of  the  En> 
glish  possesions.  The  authority  to  cap- 
ture was  the  very  essence  of  the  wrong. 
It  foirows,  therefore,  that  an  effectual  re- 
vocation  required  that  the  authority  to 
cafilure  should  be  annulled  Granting, 
therefore,  for  the  sake  of  argument  (what 
from  its  terms  and  its  nature  was  cer- 
tainly i\ot  the  case)  that  the  noted  letter 
of  the  duke  of  Cadore  of  the  5th  of  Au- 
gust, 1810,  held  forth  a  revocation,  good 


ing  to  the  neutral  commerce  of  the  U. 
States,  and  so  important  to  the  peace  of 
the  nation,  was  it  not  the  duty  ot  the  pre- 
sident to  have  the  evidence  of  such  an- 
nulment before  the  issuing  of  any  pro- 
clamation ?  Has  he  ever  insisted  upon 
such  evidence  ?  Was  it  of  no  conse- 
quence in  the  relative  situation  of  this 
country  as  to  foreign  powers  that  the  re- 
gular evidence  should  he- received  by  our 
administration  and  made  known  ?  Why 
has  a  mavler  of  evidence,  so  obviously 
proper,  so  simple  in   its  natui'e,  so  level 


in  point  of  form,  and  unconditional,  yet    to  general  apprehension,  and  so  imperi- 


it  was  not  that  effectual  revocation  for 
■which  the  act  of  laJ^May,  1810,  alone 
authorized  the  pi-esident  of  the  U.  States 
to  issue  his  proclamation,  unless  in  con- 
sequence of  that  letter  the  authority  to 
capture  ivas  annulled.  The  letter  itselt 
is  no  annulment  of  the  authority  to  cap- 
ture, and  it  is  notorious  that  no  evidence 
of  the  annulment  ot  this  authority  to 
capture  ever  has  been  adduced.  It  has 
not  even  been  pretended.  On  the  con- 
trary, there  is  decisive  and  almost  daily 
evidence  of  the  continued  existence  of 
this  authority  to  capture. 

The  charge  of  executing  the  decrees 
of  Berlin  and  Milan  was,  so  far  as  con- 
cerned his  department,  given,  by  the 
terms  of  those  decrees,  to  the  French  mi- 
nister of  marine.  According  to  establish- 


ously  demanded  by  the  circumstances  of 
the  case,  been  wholly  omitted  I  And  why, 
if  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  are  an- 
nulled, as  is  pretended,  does  the  French 
emperour  withhold  this  evidence  of  their 
annulment  ?  Why  does  he  withhold  ^t 
when  the  question  of  revocation  is  pre- 
sented under  circumstances  of  so  much 
urgency  ? 

Not  only  has  it  never  been  pretended 
that  any  such  imperial  act  of  annulment 
has  issued,  or  that  any  such  orders  or  in- 
structions, countermanding  the  authority 
to  capture,  were  ever  given,  but  there  i , 
decisive  evidence  of  the  reverse  in  the 
conduct  of  the  French  publick  armod 
ships  and  privateers.  At  all  times  since 
Nov.  1810,  these  ships  and  privatetrs 
have  continued  to  capture   our  vessels 


cd  principles  of  j;eneral  law,  the  inn>e-  and  property  on  the  high  seas,  upon  the 
rial  act  which  gave  the  authority  must  be  principles  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  de- 
annulled  by  another  imperial  act,  equally  crccs.  A  numerous  list  of  American 
formal  and  solemn;  or,  at  least,  the  au-  vessels  thus  taken  since  the  1st  of  Nov. 
thority  to  capture  must  be  countermand-  1810,  now  exists  in  the  office  of  the  se- 
ed by  some  order  or  instruction  from  the  cretary  of  state;  and  among  the  captures 
minister  of  marine.  Nothing  short  of  arc  several  vessels,  with  their  cargoes, 
this  cohUI  annul  the  authority  according  lately  taken  and  destroyed  at  sea,  withour. 
to  the  rule  of  the  sea  service.  Was  such  the  formality  of  a  trial,  by  the  command- 
annulling  act  ever  issued  by  the  French  cr  of  a  French  squadron  at  this  moment 
emperour?  Were  any  such  counter-  cruising  against  our  commerce,  unde" 
manding  orders  or  instructions  ever  gi-  orders  given  by  the  minister  of  marine. 


ven  by  the  French  minister  of  marine  ? 
In  exercising  a  trust  committed  to  him 

prize,  as  contrary  to  the  present  decree,  iincl 
mat/ he  rafitured  by  our  ships  ofieart  or  otir  priva- 
fftrt,  and  adjudged  tu  the  captav." 


to  whom  the  execution  of  the  decrees 
was  committed;  and  these,  too,  issued  in 
January  last.  In  the  Baltick  and  Medi- 
terranean seas,  captures  by  French  pri- 
vateers are  known  to  us,  by  official  docu- 
ments, to  have  been  made  under  the  au< 


^•W 


Pfp 


m 


IQ 


(V 


f 


I 


M' 


^  I 


ii 


it 


\^ 


Ihority  of  these  decrees.  How  then  are 
they  revoked  ?  How  huve  they  ceased  to 
violate  our  neutral  commerce  ? 

Hud  any  repeal,  or  modification  of 
those  decrees,  in  truth  taken  place,  it 
must  have  been  communicated  to^the 
prize  courts,  and  would  have  been  evi- 
denced by  some  variation  either  in  their 
rules,  or  in  the  principles  of  their  deci- 
sions. In  vain,  however,  will  this  nation 
seek  for  such  proof  of  the  revocation  of 
the  decrees.  No  acquittal  has  ever  been 
had,  in  any  of  the  prize  courts,  upon  the 
(ground  that  the  Berlin  and  Milait  decrees 
hud  censed,  even  as  it  respects  the  Uni- 
ted Stales.  On  the  contrary,  the  evidence 
is  dcci^ive  that  they  arc  considered  by 
the  French  courts  as  cxistinj;. 

There  are  many  caacs  corroborative  of 
this  position,  it  is  cnoiigii  to  state  only 
two,  which  appear  in  t!ie  otliciui  reports. 
The  American  sliip  Julian  was  captured 
by  a  Frenclj  privateer  on  tlic  4iii  July 
1811,  and  on  the  tenth  of  September 
181  l,the  vessel  and  car{»o  were  condemn- 
ed by  the  council  of  prizes  at  Paris, 
amonj^  other  reasons,  because  she  was 
visited  by  several  Kntflish  vessels.  On 
the  same  day  the  Hercules  an  American 
s!:ip  was  condemned  by  the  imperial 
coiirt  of  prizes,  ulley;in}y  '  that  it  was 
impossible,  that  she  was  not  visited  iiy 
the  enemy's  ships  of  war."  So  familiar 
to  thcni  was  the  existence  of  the  decrees, 
and  such  their  eagerness  to  give  them 
eiVeci  against  our  commerce,  that  they 
fained  a  visitation  to  have  taken  place, 
and  that  notwithstanding  the  express  de- 
claration of  the  captain  and  crew  to  the 
contrary.  In  addition  to  which  evidence 
Mr.  Russell's  letter  to  the  secretary  of 
state,  dated  8th  Ma;*  1811,  says:  »  It  may 
not  be  improper  to  remark  that  no  Ame- 
rican vessel  captured  since  the  1st  No- 
vember 1810,  lias  yet  been  released." 

From  this  it  is  apparent  that  the  com- 
manders of  the  national  vessels,  the 
pi'ivatecrsmen  and  the  judges  of  the 
prize  courts,  to  which  may  be  added  also 
the  custom  house  officers,  who,  as  the 
instruments  of  carrying  into  effect  the 
decrees,  must  have  been  made  acquaint- 


ed with  the  repeal  had  it  existed,  have 
been,  from  first  to  last,  ignorant  of  uny  re- 
vocation; and  uniformly  acted  upon  the 
principle  of  their  existence. 

If  other  evidence  of  the  continued  ex- 
istence of  those  decrees  were  requisite, 
the  acts  of  the  French  ^overnmenfaflbrd 
such  as  is  full  and  explicit.  Champagny, 
duke  of  Cadore,  minister  of  foreign  re- 
lations,  in  his  report  to  his  majesty  the 
emperour  and  king,  dated  Pari^,  3d  De- 
cember, 1810,  speaking  of  the  decrees  of 
Berlin  and  Milan,  says  expressly:  «  As 
long  as  England  shall  persist  in  her  or- 
ders in  council,  your  majesty  ivill  fiersitt 
in  iiour  decrees'* — Than  which  no  decla- 
ration can  be  moi^  direct  not  only  that 
the  Berlin  and  IVlnan  decrees  arc  unre- 
voked, but  that  they  will  so  remain,  until 
the  English  orders  in  council  are  with- 
drawn. And  in  the  address  delivered  by 
his  imperial  maje»ty>  Napoleon,  to  the 
council  of  commerce  on  the  31st  March 
1811,  he  thus  declares:  "The  decress  of 
Berlin  and  Milan  are  the  iundamental 
laws  of  my  empire.  For  the  neutral  na- 
vigation I  consider  the  Bag  as  an  exten- 
sion of  territory.  The  power  which  suf- 
fers its  flag  to  be  violated,  cannot  be  con- 
sidered as  neutral.  The  fate  of  the  A- 
merican  commerce  will  soon  be  decided. 
I  will  fiuour  it  if  the  United  States  con- 
form themselves  to  these  decrees.  In  a 
contrary  case  their  vessels  will  be  driven 
Irom  my  empire." 

And  as  late  as  the  loth  of  March  last, 
in  a  i-eport  of  the  French  minister-  of 
foreign  relations,  communicated  to  the 
conservative  senate,  it  is  declared  "  that 
as  long  as  the  British  orders  in  council 
are  not  revoked,  and  the  principles  of 
the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  in  relation  to  neu- 
trals put  in  force,  the  decrees  of  Berlin 
and  Milan  ought  to  subsist,  for  the 
powers  who  suffer  their  flag  to  be  de- 
nationalized." In  none  of  these  acts  is 
there  any  exception  in  favour  of  the  U. 
States.  And  on  the  contrary  in  the  re- 
port of  March  last,  by  placing  those  de- 
crees on  the  basis  of  "  the  principles  of 
the  treaty  of  Utrecht,"  the  French  minis- 
ter has  extended  the  terms  of  revocation 
beyond  all  prior  pretensions.  v. 


•f*-mmmtttmt^ 


w*»a»iii,»„j\Viir 


17 


existed,  have 
ant  of  any  re* 
;ed  upon  the 

ontinueil  ex- 
M'c  requisite, 
i'nmcnt*aflbrtf 
Champagny, 
if  foreign  re» 
majesty  the 
i^avib,  3d  De- 
lie  decrees  of 
rcssly:   «  As 
ist  in  her  or- 
y  ivill /lersist 
ich  no  decla- 
lot  only  that 
es  are  unre- 
'einain,  until 
:.il  are  with- 
dclivcred  by 
>leon>  to  the 
31st  March 
le  decress  of 
fundamental 
s  neutral  na- 
as  an  exten- 
r  which  suf< 
nnot  be  con* 
te  of  the  A- 
je  decided. 
States  con- 
rees.     In  a 
1  be  driven 

March  last, 
minister  of 
atcd  to  the 
arcd  "  that 

in  council 
inciples  of 
ion  to  neu- 
s  of  Berlin 
for   the 

to  be  de- 
tesc  acts  is 
r  of  the  U. 

in  the  re- 

those  dc- 
•inciples  of 
nch  minis* 

revucatioa 


St 


Those  who  maintain  the  reTocatlon  of 
^  these  decrees  as  it  respects  the  Unittul 
^States,  rely  wholly  upon  the  suspension 
cf  the  decisions  of  the  French  price 
courts,  in  relation  to  some  few  vessels, 
and  the  liberation  of  others,  by  the  special 
direction  of  the  Frenph  emperour.  Can 
thei-e  be  stronger  presumptive  evidence 
jitf  Itke  existence  of  those  decrees  than 
liis— that  no  vessel  is  excttpted  from 
their  operation,  until  after  the  special 
exercise  of  the  emperour's  willt  in  the 
particular  case. 

If  the  decrees  were  effectively  revo- 
ked, there  would  be  no  captures;  or  if 
any  were  made,   liberation   would   be  a 
matter  of  course  and  of  general  r^ght;  in- 
stead of  being  an  affair  of  particular  fa- 
vour or  caprice.    Is  it  for  vexations  and 
indulgencies  like  these,  that  the  people 
of  the  United  States  are  to  abandon  their 
commerce  and  peace?     Is  it  for  such  fa- 
vours they  are  to  invite  the  calamities  of 
war?  If  the  resources  of  negotiation  were 
exhausted,  had  the  government  no  pow- 
ers remaining  to  diminish  the  causes  of 
national     controversy,    by     preventing 
abuses?     After  this,  had  it  no  powers  lo 
provide  for  protecting  indisputable  and 
important  rights,  without  waging  a  war 
of  offence?    In  the  regular   exercise  of 
legislative  and  executive  powers,  might 
not  the  fair  objects  of  interest  for  our 
country  have  been  secured  completely  by 
consistent  and  wholesome  plans  for  de- 
fensive protection?    And  would  not  a  na- 
tional   position,    strictly   defensive,   yet 
highly  respectable,  have  been   less  bur- 
thensome  to  the  people  than  the  project- 
ed war?     Would  it  not  be  more  friendly 
to  the  cause  of  our  own  seamen— more 
safe  for  our  navigation  and  commerce; 
more  favourable    to  the  interests  of  our 
agriculture;  less  hazardous  to  national 
character;  more  worthy  of  a  people  jea- 
lous of  their  liberty  and  independence? 

For  entering  into  these  hostilities  is 
there  any  thing  in  the  friendship  or 
commerce  of  France  in  its  nature 
very  interesting  or  alluring?  Will 
the  reaping  of  the  scanty  fields  of 
[French  trade,  which   wo  seek)  in  any 


way  compensate  for  the  rich  harvest  of 
general  commerce,  wliichby  war  we  are 
aboiit  to  abandon  ?  When  entering  into 
a  war,  with  Great  Britain,  for  commer- 
cial rights  and  interests,  it  seems  impos- 
sible  not  to  inquire  into  the  state  of 
our  commercial  relations  with  Fr.^nce, 
and  the  advantages  the  United  States 
will  obtain.  We  may  thus  be  enabled 
to  judge  whether  the  prize  is  worth  the 
contest. 

By  an  ofRcial  statement,  made  to  con- 
gress during  the  present  session,  it  ap- 
pears that  of  45,394,000  dollars  of  domes- 
tick  productions  of  the  United  States, 
exported  from  September  30th,  1810,  to 
October  1st,  1811,  only  1,194,275  dollars 
were  exported  to  France  and  Italy,  in- 
cluding ^cily,  not  a  dependency  of 
Franca.  '  ^'  '*^  5'>-\ 

France  is  nov  deprived  of  all  her  fo- 
reign colonies,  and  by  reviewing  our 
trade  with  that  country  for  several  years 
past  and  before  the  date  of  the  orders  in 
council,  it  will  appear  that,  exclusive  of 
her  foreign  possessions,  it  has  been  f.om- 
paratively  inconsiderable.  The  annex- 
ed statement  marked  A  taken  from  offi- 
cial documents,  shows  the  quantity  of 
particular  articles,  the  produce  of  the 
United  States  exported  to  all  the  world, 
distinguishing  the  amount  both  to  France 
and  to  England  and  her  dependencies 
from  1 8 10  to  Id  1 1 .  From  this  statement 
it  appears,  now  small  a  proportion  of  the 
great  staples  of  our  country  is  taken  *  by 

•  It  appears  by  it  that  for  twelve  years  past 
France  lias  not  taken  in  any  year,  more  than 
Cotton  7,000,000  pounds 

Rice  7  000  tierces 

Tobacco  '     16,000  hoj^aheads 

Dried  Fish  87,000  quintals 

Of  flower,  naval  stores,  and  lumber,  none  oi 
any  importance. 

It  also  appears,  by  it,  that  the  annual  average 
taken  by  France  for  twelve  years,  was,  of 
Cotton  2,664,090  pounds 

Rice  2,253  tierces, 

Tobacco  5,927  hog'sheads 

Fish  ....         24,735  quintals 

Of  late  years  some  of  these  articles  have  rot 
been  shipped  at  all  directly  to  France,  but  they 
h*ve,  probably,  found  their  way  thither  tiivough 
the  northern  ports  of  Europe. 

c- 


.11 


..«> 


18 


r.i' 


^nce.  While  Franae  retained  her 
colonies  produce  found  its  way  to  the  mo- 
thwr  country  through  tl»e  United  States, 
•lid  our  trade  with  her  in  these  ar- 
ticles, was  not  inconsiderable.  But  since 
the  has  been  deprived  oi  her  foreign  pos- 
sessions, and  since  the  establishment  of 
her  municipal  regulations,  as  to  licenses, 
this  trade  has  been  in  a  great  degree, 
annihilated.  With  respect  to  colonial 
pro. luce  none  can  be  imported  into  France 
except  from  particular  ports  of  the  Uni- 
ted States  and  under  special  imperial  li- 
censes. For  these  licenses  our  mer- 
chants must  pay  what  the  agent?  of  the 
French  government  think  proper  to  de- 
mand. As  to  articles  of  our  domestick 
'|»roduce,  they  are  burdsned  with  such 
exorbitant  duties,  and  ai  ubjected  to 
such  regulations  and  res*  dons  on  their 
importation  as,  in  ordh-j  y  imes,  will 
amount  to  a  prohibition.  On  the  5th  of 
August  1810,  the  very  day  of  the  duke 
of  Cadore's  noted  letter,  a  duty  was  im- 
posed on  all  sea  island  cotton,  imported 
into  France,  of  more  than  eighty  cents 
per  pound,  and  on  other  cotton  of  about 
tixty  cents  per  pound,  amounting  to  (hree 
or  four,  times  their  original  cost  in  the 
,  United  States.  And  as  to  tobacco,  the 
French  minister  here  on  the  23d  July 
1811  informed  our  government  that  it 
was  "  under  an  administration  [en  regiel 
in  France;  the  administra'ion  (he  saysj 
is  the  only  consumer  and  can  purchase 
only  the  quantity  necessary  for  its  con- 
sumption." And  by  other  regulations 
not  more  than  one  Ji/teeth  of  all  the  to- 
bacco consumed  in  France,  can  be  of  fo- 
reign growth.  The  ordinary  quantity 
of  tobacco  annually  consumed  in  France 
is  estimated  at  thirty  thouaand hogaheadsy 
leaving  only  about  two  thotisand  hogs- 
heads of  foreign  tobacco  to  be  purchased 
in  France. 

In  addition  to  these  impositions  and 
restrictions,  the  importer  is  not  left  at 
liberty  with  respect  to  his  return  cargo. 
By  other  edicts,  he  is  compelled  to  vest 
the  avails  of  his  importations,  if,  after 
paying  duties  and  seizures,  any  remain, 
fm  auici)  artible^  of  Frojich  jpruduce  and 


manufacture,  as  the  French  government 
thinks  proper  to  direct.  Two  thirds  at 
least  must  be  laid  out  in  silks  and  the 
other  third  in  wines,  brandies,  and  other 
articles,  of  that  country.  To  show  that 
this  account  of  our  commercial  relations 
with  France  does  not  rest  on  doubtful 
authority,  the  undersigned  would  refer 
to  the  statements  and  declarations  of  our 
government  on  this  subject.  In  a  letter 
from  Mr.  Smith,  the  late  secretr.ry  of 
state,  to  the  minister  of  France  here,  of 
the  18th  December,  1810,  speaking  of 
our  trade  to  that  country,  under  its  regu- 
lations, after  the  pretended  repeal  of  the 
decrees,  Mr.  Smith  says:  "The  resttic- 
tions  of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  had 
the  efTect  of  restraining  the  American 
merchants  from  sending  their  vessels  to 
France.  The  interdictions  in  the  system 
that  has  been  substituted,  against  the 
admission  of  American  products,  will 
have  the  effect  of  imposing  upon  them  an 
equal  restraint." 

*<  If  then,  for  the  revoked  decrees, 
municipal  laws,  producing  the  same 
commercial  effect  have  been  substituted,' 
the  mode  only,  and  not  the  measure,  has 
undergone  an  alteration.  And  however 
true  it  may  be,  that  the  change  is  law« 
ful  in  form,  it  is,  nevertheless,  as  true, 
that  it  is  essentially  unfriendly,  and  that 
it  does  not  at  all  comport  with  the  ideas, 
inspired  by  your  letter  of  the  27th  ult.  in 
which  you  were  pleased  to  declare  the 
(  distinctly  pronounced  intention  of  his 
imperial  majesty  of  favouring  the  com- 
mercial relations,  between  France  and 
the  United  States,  in  all  the  objects  of 
trafRck,  which  shall  evidently  proceed 
from  their  agriculture,  or  manufactures.* 
"If  France  by  her  own  acts,  has  blocka- 
ded up  her  ports  against  the  introduction 
of  the  products  of  the  United  States, 
what  motive  has  this  government,  in  a 
discussion  with  a  third  power,  to  insist 
on  the  privilege  of  going  to  France  f 
Whence  the  inducement,  to  urge  the 
annulment  of  a  blockade  of  France, 
when,  if  annulled,  no  American  cargoes 
could  obtain  a  market  in  any  of  her 
portsJ  In  such  a  state  of  things^aM^k- 


m 


•>"■«  II    ilBii.  «» 


SsrBSft^^^  - "'- 


» 


<\' 


ich  government 
Two  thirds  at 
n  silks  and  the 
idies,  and  other 
To  show  that 
icrcial  relations 
:st  on  doubtful 
ed  would  refer 
:Iarations  of  our 
:ct.  In  a  letter 
e  secrctr.ry  of 
France  here,  of 
10,  speaking  of 
under  its  regu> 
:d  repeal  of  the 
"  The  restric- 
Ian  decrees  had 
the  American 
their  vessels  to 
IS  in  the  systent 
d>  against  the 
products,  will 
S  upon  them  an 

oked   decrees, 
ng    the   same 
en  substitutedy- 
}  measure,  has 
And  however 
hange  is  law- 
less, as  true, 
ndly,  and  that 
i^ith  the  ideasj 
he  2rth  ult.  in 
to  declare  the 
tention  of  his 
ing  the  com- 
n  France  and 
the  objects  of 
sntly  proceed 
lanufacturea.* 
i,  has  blocka- 
;  introduction 
niied   States, 
rnment,  in  a 
fver,  to  insist 

to   France? 
to  urge  the 

of  France, 
rican  cargoes 

any  of  her 
ngS}  a  Mocfk- 


i^de  of  the  coast  of  France  would  be,  to 
Uie  United  States,  us  unimportant,  as 
would  be  a  blockade  of  the  coast  of  the 
Caspian  sea." 

And  so  far  has  the  French  emperour 
been  from  relaxing,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
these  odious  regulations  as  to  us,  in  con- 
•equence  of  our  submitting  to  give  up 
^ur  English  trade,  that  they  have  been 
made  a  subject  of  special  instructions,  to 
the   minister  who  has  been  sent  to   the 
court  of  France.    Mr    Monroe,  in  his 
letter  of  instructions  to  Mr.  Barlow  of 
July    36,    1811,  says:  "  Your  early   and 
particular  atttention  will  be  drawn  to  the 
great  subject  of  the  commercial  relation 
vrhich  is    to  subsist,  in   future,  between 
the    United    States   and    France.    The 
President  expects  that  the  commerce  of 
the  United  States  will  be  placed,  in  the 
ports  of  France,  on  such  a  footing  as  to 
afford  it  a  fair  luarket)  and  to  the  indus- 
try  and  Enterprise  of  their  citizens,   a 
reasonable  encouragement.  An  arrange- 
ment to  this  effect  was  looked  for,  imme- 
diately after  the  revocation  of  the  decrees, 
but  it  appears  from  the  documents,  in 
this   department,    that  that  was   not  the 
case;  on  the  contrary  that  our  commerce 
haa  been  subjected  to  the  grcateat  discou- 
ragementy  or  rather^  to  the  moat  o/ifirea 
tive   reatraintsi  that  the  vessels,  which 
carried  coffee,  sugar,  Sec.  though  sailing 
directly  from  the    United    States  to   a 
French   port,    were  held   in  a  state  of 
sequestration,  on  the  principle,  that  the 
trade  was  prohibited,  and  that  the  impor- 
tation of  these  articles  was  not  only  un- 
lawful, but  criminal;  that  even  the  ves- 
sels,  which  carried  the   unquesiionahle 
productions  of  the   United  States,   were 
exposed  to  great  and  expensive  delays, 
tedious  inv .  siijjations,  in  unusual  forms, 
and   to  exorbitant  dutien.     In  shf)rt  that 
the    ordinary   usajytis  of  comnuM-ce   be- 
tween y»*iVnrf/y  nationn  were  abandoned." 
Again   Mr.    Monroe,  in  the  same  let- 
ter, says:  «'  It  the  ports  of  France,    and 
her  allies  are  not  opened  to    the    com- 
merce of  tiie  United  States,  on  a  libe- 
ral    scale    and  on     fair    conditions,    of 
what  avail    tu  them,   it  may  be  asked, 


will  be  the  revocation  of  the  British  oft 
ders  in  council  \  In  contending  for  t,h6 
revocation  ctf  hcse  orders,  so  far  as  it 
was  an  object  of  interest,the  United  States 
had  in  view,  a  trade  to  the  continent.  It 
was  a  fair,  legitimate  object  and  worth 
contending  for,  while  France  encouraged 
it.  But  if  she  shuts  her  ports  on  our 
commerce,  or  burdens  it  with  heavy 
duties,  that  motive  is  at  an  end."  He 
again  says:  "  You  will  see  the  injustice 
and  endeavour  to  prevent  the  necessity 
of  bringing  in  return  for  American  carii 
goes,  sold  in  France,  an  equal  amount  in 
the  firoduce,  or  manufacturea  of  that 
country.  No  such  obligation  is  imposed 
on  French  merchants,  trading  to  the 
United  States.  They  enjoy  the  liberty 
of  selling  the?r  cargoes  for  cash,  and 
taking  back  what  they  please  from  this 
country,  in  return.  It  is  indispensable, 
that  the  trade  be  free,  that  all  American 
citizens  engaged  in  it  be  placed  on  the 
same  footing,  and,  with  this  view,  that 
the  system  of  carrying  it  on,  by  ticensesy 
granted  by  French  agents  be  immediate* 
ly  annulled." 

The  despatches  from  Mr.  Barlow,  by 
the  Hornet,  most  clearly  show  that  the 
ex/iectationa  of  our  government  have  not 
only  not  been  realized,  but  that  even  the 
firomiies  obtained,  by  our  minister  are 
of  a  very  unsatisfactory  nature.  Indeed 
while  Bonaparte  is  sending  armies  to  the 
north  of  Europe,  to  take  possession  of  the 
ports  on  the  Baltick,  and  by  his  fast  sail- 
ing squadrons,  is  burning  American  ves- 
sels on  the  Atlantick,  all  expectations o£* 
a  free  trade  from  France,  must  be  worse 
than  vain. 

Notwithstandini*  the  violence  of  the 
bellit^erents,  were  the  restrictions  of  our 
own  government  removed,  the  commerce 
of  the  United  States  might  be  extensive 
and  profitable.  It  is  well  known  that 
from  the  gallantry  of  our  seamen,  if  mer* 
cliant  vessels  were  allowed  to  arm  and 
associate  fo'"  self  defence,  they  would  be 
able  to  repel  many  unlawful  aggressions. 
The  danger  of  capture  would  be  dimi- 
nished, and  in  relation  to  one  ol"  the 
belligerents  at  least,  the  risk,  under  such 


20 


i 


'•".•/iir ?.:;-V» ir;;;r ^Xa";  .£-" « Stt  r f  '• 


mnAu  ***    P«>  a  tribiife  t«.  I?     .  house  offict  r<j    in    Y        "^^^  O"*  custom 

«"«    W„c\X'  Tli^"'  fZ""''  "  '4    F«„' Y'  "[."■"-ercial  ad™, 

Were..J"Lr?o  ^^^P"'  1809,  th"  nrn  "  ^'^«  ""oral  estimate  of  """••' 
„  •  7  '^oJifiocI,  and  the  n/  P'^P^Pects,  there  is  .V?  u°^  national 
^«'>^«  duty  called  by  the  Fn. .1'    »^'"'  °''  consoJation L  i'L'lt  '=A«''«'=ter    to 


Were  revn 

noxious  »1"""'  T  '^O'^'fiofN  and  the  "ni7    P^^P^cts,   there    is"ii;'.r"  u°'   "*"onal 

!:«,;.„..     "°^''  tne  subicct  nfrn/.,^.„:      .  '        ^  nation.  Ht^  »u-.  rr  .     . 


iimile,!  ,0  „"„,,/'""  °''"">Plai">  is    „v  i„i,' '""'"'«  United  Sta,.     .. 

and.cffj, '    ..V'^*^'^^»'"es,  plantatinn,      777^:: — ^>l^-•lt.s    fire- 


plac<  s  under  lucTnl''  ''"'^  **"  PO''t^  and 
^°KT;hor    «iu  '  He^  c\T'"""'  of  France, 

»°^'''"'n.>nrs  res  Hcl?/'''''\^^  ^^'''"se 
«'"!  iWace,  in  the  ,orH  ''  ""''  ^''  P°'-ts 
»^  ^^^  --ecko  cd  fr^r?'"  ''"'"'  «'  I'^^'y* 


'  Value  of  articles  nfJ  ~~~ 

'''""In  isS"  "'«  ^Sd     "'""''^'^  P^'l^ce,  ex. 
Whole  amount. 


In  180r 
W/ioJe  amount. 
848.699,592 


puit  of  France 
To  Italy        ♦ 


«  Pa'-f  nf  iraiv.     ^^  ^  j^"'^";  Holland  and 

»'"*    ';-•  commerce  "1-lrt'"''^'''-'^"'<> 
>vorld.    What  that  is\         "^'■'^"^ofU'e     "  ^ '' 

b^  formed  bvVecl' '"^^^  ToE„  i    ^ 

f  tables  u hi^ir  :r;;:  ^'r  ^"^j^"'  XSncS 

l^vo  last  year,  uufecedcnt"  to    tlfrolrr       "' ''' 


3.609,964 
18o,346 

7,022,008" 


2,716,141 

3.098,234 
250,257 


'^:.'*^ 


Js.irp.gsi 

14.051,?'40 


27.9i5,orr 

14.719,883 
42,634So 


] 
I 
I 
c 

I 

tl 
tl 
tt 

h 

m 
ca 
fri 

leni 


t 


system.    By  that 

the  value  of  the 
stick   products  to 

Italy,  was,  during 
1  average  only  of 
illion  qf  dollara.^^ 

of  our  domestick 
arts  of  the  world, 
ft  free  to  us  not- 
i  of  the  British  or- 
tl  t/iiriy  eight  mil' 
a  commerce  it  iit 
for  the  restricted 
pcrour  will  allow, 
m positions,  or  ha- 
om  French  domU 
uaniersf  or  custom 
)8t  every   port  of 

ammercial  advan* 
le  to  offer,  in  re- 
)us  hazards,  which 
of  her  Emperour, 
about  to  incur; 
nate  of  national 
ttle  character  to 
xpect  in  the  dark 
sh  we  are  enter- 

dted  States,  hap- 
lations;  removed 
of  Europe;  with 
ng  vast  fields  for 
-ial  possessions, 
ivant; — its  fire- 
stick  produce,  ex. 

In  1807 
Whole  amount, 
§48.699,592 


2,716,141 

3,098,234 
250,257 

6,064,632 


27,915,07r 
14,719,883 
42,634,960 


tides  safe;— .its  altars  undefiled; — from 
invasion  nothing  to  fear; — from  acqui> 
iltion  nothing  to  hope; — how  shall  such 
a  nation  look  to  Heaven  fur  its  smiles, 
while  throwing  away,  as  though  they 
were  worthless,  all  the  blessings  and 
joysi  which  peace  and  such  a  diiitin> 
gtiishfed  lot,  include  ?  With  what  pray- 
ers can  it  address  the  Most  High,  when 
it  prepares  to  pour  forth  its  youthful 
rage,  upon  a  neighbouring  people;  from 
whose  strenf^th,  it  has  nothing  to  dread, 
from  whose  devastation  it  has  nothing  to 
gain  ? 

If  our  ills  were  of  a  nature  that  war 
would  remedy;  if  war  would  compensate 
any  of  our  losses;  or  remove  any  of  our 
complains,  there  might  be  some  allevia- 
tion of  the  suffering  in  the  charm  of  the 
prospect.  But  how  will  war  upon  the 
land  protect  commerce  upon  the  ocean? 
What  balm  has  Canada  for  wounded 
honour?  How  are  our  mariners  benefited 
by  a  war  which  exposes  those  who  are 
free,  without  promising  release  to  those 
I   who  are  impressed? 

But  it  is  said  that  war  is  demanded  by 
honour.  Is  national  honour  ^  principle 
which  thirsts  after  vengeance,  and  is  ap- 
peased only  by  blood;  which,  trampling 
on  the  hopes  of  man,  and  spurning  the 
law  of  God,  untaught  by  what  is  past  and 
careless  of  what  is  to  come,  precipitates 
itself  into  any  folly  or  -^  dness  to  gratify 
a  selfish  vanity  or  to  satiatiatc  some 
unhallowed  rage?  If  honour  demands 
a^war  with  England,  what  opiate  lulls 
that  honour  to  sleep  over  the  wrongs  done 
us  by  France?  On  land,  robberies,  sei- 
zures, imprisonments  by  French  autho- 
rity; at  sea,  pillage,  sinkings,  burnings 
under  French  orders.  These  are  notori- 
ous. Are  they  unfelt  because  they  are 
French?  Is  any  alleviation  to  be  found  in 
the  correspondence  and  humiliations  of 
the  present  minister  plenipotentiary  of 
the  United  States  at  the  French  court? 
In    his  communications  to  our  govern- 

Lment,  as  before  the  publick,  where  is  the 
cause  for  now  selecting  France,  as  the 
friend  of  our  country  and  England  as  the 
enemy? 


If  no  illusions  of  personal  feeling,  and 
no  solicitude  for  elevation  of  place,  should 
be    permitted   to  misguide    the  publick 
councils;  if  it  is,  indeed,  honourable  lor 
the  true  statesman  to  consult  the  publick 
welfare,  to  provide, in  truth,  for  the  pub- 
lick  defence,   and    impose   no   yokt^    of 
bondage;    with   full  knowledge    of   the 
wrongs  inflicted  by   the   French,  ought 
the  government  of  this  country   to    aid 
the  French  cause  by  engaging  in  war 
against  the  enemy  of  France  ?     To  sup- 
ply the  waste  of  such  a  war  and  to  meet 
the   appropriations  of  millions  extraor- 
dinary, for  the  war  expenditures,  must 
our  feUdw  citiacns,  throughout  the  union, 
be  doomed  to  sustain  the  burden  of  war 
taxes,  in  various  fornis  of  direct  and  indi- 
rect imposition  ?     For   official  informa- 
tion, respecting  the  milions  deemed   re- 
quisite for  charges  of  the  war;  for    like 
information,  respecting  the  nature    a^d 
amount  of  taxes,  deemed   requisite  for 
drawing  those  millions   from   the   com- 
munity, it  is  here  sufficient   to  refer  to 
estimates  and  reports  made   by    the  se- 
cretary of  the  treasury  and  the  committee 
of  ways  and  means,  and  tu   the  body  of 
resolutions,  passed  in  March  last,  in  the 
house  of  representatives. 

It  would  be  some  rthef  to  our  anxiety, 
if  amends  were  likely  to  be  made,  for 
the  we-kness  and  wildness  of  the  project, 
by  the  prudence  of  the  preparation.  But 
in  no  aspect  of  this  anomalous  affair 
can  we  tiace  tlie  gieat  and  distinctive 
properties  of  wisdom.  There  is  seen  a 
hendlong  rushing  imo  difficulties,  with 
little  calculation  about  the  means  and  Utile 
concern  about  tl:e  consequences.  With  a 
navy  comparatively  nominal-  we  are  aiout 
to  ehter  into  the  lists  against  the  gita'cst 
marine  on  the  glohe  '^  ith  a  comme'  ce, 
unprotected  and  spread  over  every  ocean, 
we  propose  to  rnake  profit  by  privateering, 
and  for  this  endanger  the  wealth,  ol"  which 
We  are  holiest  proprietors.  An  inva-sion  is 
threatened  of  'lie  colonies  of  a  power, 
which,  without  putting  a  new  ship  into 
commission,  or  taking  anotner  sf.lciier  in- 
to pay,  can  spread  alarm .  or  desola- 
tion   along  the   extcnbive   range   of  our 


^2 


Si!     ' 


heahoNrd.    The  reiourcei  of  our  countrf,    Benjamin  DaUmadgtt  H.  Sleeeker^ 


«t- 


John  Baketf 
Jot.  Lema^jun. 
A.  MBrydct 


in  fhiir  natural  tiate,  great  beyond  our    jj,^^^  Emott 
waiti,  or  our  hopes  are  impaired  by  the  ' 

effect  of  artificial  reatraints.  Before  ade*  TAot.  B.  Go/</, 
qu  tfl  fortificationa  are  prep  red  for  do-  jjfif^  Ridrely 
mentick  (i' fence,  bcfioie  meh,  or  monejr  ^  ^^ 

•re  providi  d  for  a  war  of  attack  why  hat-  Philifi  B.  Key^ 
ten  into  iht  midst  of  that  awful  conttst, 
w  ich  is  laying  waste  Europe?  It  cannot 
be  concealed,  that  to  engage  in  the  pre- 
■enr  war  against  England  ia  to  place  our 
•tlvt  s  on  the  side  of  Fiance;  and  exposea 
n^  to  the  vass'ilage  of  ittatcs,  a^^rving  un- 
der the  banners  of  the  French  Emperour. 

The  undersigned  cannot  refrain  from 
asking  what  &rt:  the  United  State«  to  gain 
by  this  warf  Will  the  gratification  of 
•ome  privateersmen  compensate  the  na- 
tion for  that  sweep  of  our  legitimate  com- 
merce hy  the  extended  marine  of  our 
«nt  my,  wi.ich  this  desperate  act  invites? 
Will  Canada  compensate  the  middle 
states,  for  New  York;  or  the  we<ttern  states 
fo:  New  Orleans?  Let  us  not  be  deceiv- 
ed A  war  of  iiiva  Jon  may  invite  a  retort 
ot  invasion.  When  we  visit  the  peacea- 
ble, and,  as  to  us,  innocent  colonies  of 
Great  liritnin  with  the  horrous  oi  war  can 
We  he  assured  that  our  own  coast  will  not 
be  visited  with  like  horrours? 


wf«a  Fitch^  t 

Jamet  MUnor^ 
C.  Gotd»boroufAf 
Philip  Stuart, 
Ja:  Breckenridfe, 
Thoa.  IVUaon,      , 
Joa.  Pearaon,        ' 


NOTE  A.  < 

Quantity  of  part'.cular  articlea^  the  /ir(J- 
duce  of   the    United  Statea,  ex/iorted 
from  1 800  to  1811,  viz. 

COTTON. 

'       ofthe'world.    T"  France.  To  England 
/6a,               Iba.  lbs. 

17,789  803       none  16,179,513 

20911,201       844,728  18,953,065 

27,501.075    1,907,849  23,473,935 

4 1 , 1 05,6:23  3,«a  1 ,840  27,757,307 

38,118.041    5,946  848  25,770,74t 

40,383  t91   4,504,329  33.571,071 

37,491.282  7.082. 118  24,256,457 

66,6I2,7.')7  6,114.358  53,180,911 
12.064,346  2,087,450       7.993,593 


1800 
1801 
1803 
1803 
1804 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 


At  a  crisis  of  the  world  such  as   lie  pre      lOlOf  93,874,201 
sent,  and  under  impressions  such  as  these,    18111  6''.,186 

the  unde  signed  could  notcensider  the  war 
into  which  the  U<  Sta:es   have,  in  secret, 
been  precipitated,  as  necessary,  or  t  eqnir- 
ed  by  any  moral  duty,  or  any  political  eX'     1800 
pcdieiicy  1801 


1809'  53,210.225  none  direct   13,365.987 


do. 
do. 

,'      .    RICE.  . 
Tierces        Tierces 
112.056      none 
94,866  2,724 


36,171,915 
46,872,453 

Tierces 

77,547 
65,033 


George  Sutlivanf 
jtbijh.  Biffclow, 
William  Ely^ 
William  Recd^ 
Laban  Wheaton, 


Martin  Chittenden, 
Elijah  Brig  ham  f 
Josiah  Quincy, 
Saml.  Taggartf 
Leonard  White, 


Bichard  Jackson, jun.  Eliaha  R.  Potter, 
Efjafiti'a  Champion,      Jno.  Daven/iort,jr. 
Z,yman  Law,  Jona.  O.  Moaeley, 

Timo.  Pitkin,  jun.        Leivia  B.  Sturgea, 


•  III  1809,  in  conscciuen-  e  of  the  embargo 
and  non-intercoiiriie  act,  4  niillions  of  pounds  of 
Cotton  were  sliippeil  fitr  Madeira,  10  and  uluilf 
millions  to  the  Floiidus,  6  r.  i 'lions  to  Kayal 
and  other  Azores,  1  million  and  three  quarlers 
to  Portugal,  and  10  mitlions  to  Sweden. 

t  1810,  about  4  millions  of  pounds  of  Cotton 
were  sliipited  for  Spain,  .l  millions  for  Portu- 
gal, 3  millions  for  Miulcira,  10  millions  for  Flo- 
ridas,  2  millions  ft>r  Kurope  (^nerally,  4  mil-, 
lions  for  Fa>  al  and  the  Azort^s,  14  mdlions  for 
Denmark  und  Norway,  and  5  millions  for 
Sweden. 

i  In  1811,  9  millions  of  pounds  qf  Coitpn, 
were  shipped  for  Uusbia. 


^t 


»    » 


•    « 


eeeker^ 

Miinorf 
ld»6orougAf 
I  Stuart) 
BreekenridgCf 

IVihont      ^ 
*ettrton,        ' 


ule»i  the  fir^m 
tet,  exfiorted. 


To  England 

lbs. 
16,I79,S13 
1 8,953,065 
23,473,935 
27,757,307 
35,770,741 
33.571,071 
34,256,457 
53,180,311 
7,992,593 
13,365.987 
36,171,915 
46,872,453 


•ToallpMHitfthfrntrld 


Ct 


Tierces 

77,547 
65,03S 


jf  the  enUjargo 
)n8  of  pounds  of 
rii,  10  and  uliulf 
lions  to  Kayal 
,1  three  quarlers 
Sweden. 

nunds  of  Cotton 
ons  for  Portu- 
inillions  for  Flo- 
snerally,  4  mil-. 
,  14  millions  for 
5    millions  foe 

iinds  qS  Coit^n, 


1803 
1803 
1804 
l«05 

tsos 

1807 
1808 
1809 
1810 
Itll 


79,833 

81,838 

78,385 

56,830 

103,637 

9  ,693 

9,338 

116,907 

131,341 

119,356 


Ti  frtnel 
7,186 
3,116 
6,014 
1,601 
3,393 
3,006 
none  direct 

do 

do 

do 


23 

T«  EnrJand 
37,393 
31,300 
349,75 
34,737 
39,298 
37,417 
4,29  r 
32,138 
31,118 
40,045 


To  allptrtt  fftht  werli 


TOBACCO. 


Hlids 

Hhds 

Ilhds 

laoo 

78,680 

143 

37,798 

1801 

103,758 

5,006 

55,256 

t«03 

77,721 

16.216 

29,938 

1803 

86,291 

9,815 

47,829 

1804 

83.343 

14,623 

24,700 

1805 

71,i53 

12,135 

18,169 

1806 

83186 

9,183 

26,272 

1807 

62,332 

3,876 

a3,047 

J«08 

9,576 

566 

3,526 

;co 

?  3,921 

none  direct 

8,965 

84,134 

do 

34,067 

«tii 

35,828 

569 

30,343 

1 

FISH,  Dried  or  Smoked. 

Quintals 

Quintals 

Quintals 

-\800 

392,727 

none 

141,420 

1801 

410,948 

1,687 

111,030 

1803 

440,929 

27,067 

92,679 

4803 

461,870 

3,491 

71,795 

1804 

567,828 

3,765 

76,822 

1805 

514,549 

73,004 

55,676 

1^806 

537,457 

19,34r 

66,377 

fe07 

473,924 

87,654 

55,242 

^08 

155,808 

16,144 

36  998 

1809 

345  648 

n»ne 

66,566 

1810 

280  804 

2,150 

55  456 

1811 

216,387 

28  623 

33,343 

PICKLED  FISH. 
*Jfonc  exported  to  European  France. 


FLOWER. 

Bbls.            Bbls. 

Bbs. 

1.800 

653,062         none 

365.739 

1801 

1,102,444        none 

758  023 

1£02 

1,156,248       14  628 

484  88S 

1,311^853      18|045 

502,008 

1804 
1805 
1806 
1807 
1808 
!809 
1810 
1811 


8I0.0U8 
777,512 
782  724 

1,349  819 
263  ?  1 .1 
846  247 
798,431 

1,445  013 


Ti  >«aef 

1 ,  74 

none 

none 

none 

none 

none 

none 

2  96'> 


258  5\i 
335,!  76 
308  048 
619,9   • 

.70  8A 
330  824 

192  -^77 
275  534 


NAVAL  STORES— TAR. 


800 

801 
803 
803 
804 
805 
806 
807 
808 
809 
810 
811 

800 
801 
802 
F03 
804 
805 
806 
307 
808 
809 
810 
811 


Dl)ls 
59  410 
67  487 
37  497 
78  989 

58  181 
72745 
62  723 

59  282 
18.764 

128  090 

87,310 

149  796 


13  bis 

none 

none 

797 

none 

do 

do 

do 

do 

do 

do 

do 

do 


TURPENTINE. 


53  1'39 
35  413 
38  764 
61,178 
77  825 
95.640 
74  731 
53  451 
17061 
77  398 
62  913 
100.242 


no  e 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 
do 


Bbls 

58  793 
62  633 

31  330 
75  'J95 
45  210 

59  439 
50,663 

51  233 
17  700 

32  073 
50  021 

123  034 

32  580 

35  143 

36  769 

60  732 
76,950 
94  328 
71  854 

52  107 
17  009 
22,885 
36  995 

.  97  250 


LUMBER. 

Of  the  vast  quantities  of  Lumber  ex- 
ported from  1800  to  1811,  onlyafevf 
Staves  and  Heading  went  to  France,  as 
follows,  viz. 

Thousands  9f  Stavet  and  Heading, 
'  ■       1801  6,349 

1803  .    357   ' 

1804  321 

1805  466  ^' . 

1806  716 
18u7  6U 
1808  >         X^ 


:#• 


f 


I  w  fm^f  imm' 


■mVi 


mrm-nHmfilim 


•    • 


34 


■<i 


\f 


THE  subscribers  to  the  foregoing  ad-  rowing  money,  which,  it  is  hoped,  wiH 

ilress    iiaving   referred   to  the  report  of  supply  the  wants  of  the  government  t^ 

the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  for  "  offi;  afteF*|be  election.  s. 

cial  information    respecting  the  millions 


\ 


deemed  requisite  for  charges  of  the  war; 
and  to  estimates  and  reports  made  by 
the  secretary  of  the  treasury  and  the 
committee  of  ways  and  medns,  and  to 
the  body  of  resolutions  passed  in  Mdrchf 


The  following  is  a  list  of  the  bills  ^ 
laying  the  tJtxes  which  are  to  t\^ 
port  Mr.  Madison  and  the  war.  J^  . 


last  in  the  house  of  representatives,  for       .■^.**^"  ^°  '^^  ""*^  collect  a  direct  tix 
like   information  respecting  the  Tiature    within  the  United  States,   [liand  Tax.1 


and  amount  of  taxc'  deemed  requisite 
for  drawing  those  millions  from  the  uom- 
jnunity,"  the  editor  has  thought  proper 
to  subjoin  the  following  list  of  bills  re- 
ported to  the  house  of  representatives, 
by  the  committee  of  ways  and  means,  on 
the  26th  of  June  1812.  These  bills  for 
taxing  the  people  to  an  amount  altogether 
unexampled  and  unknown  in.t'  is  coun- 
try, ar^'  drawn  in  strict  conformity  to  the 
estimates,  reports,  and  resolutions  above 
referred  to;  but  instead  of  being  imme- 
diately passed  into  laws,  they  were,  upon 
a  motion  of  Mr.  Roberts  of  Pennsylvania, 
ordwed  to  lie  on  the.  table,  and ,  the 
further  consideration  of  ;theni  was  after- 
wards postponed  on  motion  of  the  same 
gentleman,  till  the  first  Monday  in  No- 
vember next,  which  will  be  after  the  elec- 
tion of  a  President  and  Vice  President. 

A  motion  to  print  the  bills  was  reject- 
ed by  a  large  :»ajority.  It  is  said  that 
the  friends  of  Mr.  Madison's  reelection 
in  congress  from  Pennsylvania  concur- 
red in  the  opinion  that  it  vvoul  I  be  ha- 
zaidous  to  let  the  people  feel  the  weight 
of  these  enormous  and  unexampled  taxes 
before  th^-  choice  of  electors.  The  pass- 
ing of  the  bills  was  therefore  postponed, 
8.nd  an  early  session  of  congress  ordes'fld, 
ao  that  as  sooii  as  the  election  is  over 
t.'iey  are  to  be  taken  up  and  the  taxes  laid 
if'ithout  delay.  In  the  mean  time  a  law  has 
fceen  passed  for  issuin.t>;  Treasury  Notes, 
e,ud  increasing  the  aaUonal  debt  by  ligr- 


r«39 

sewed, 


A  bill  for  the  assessment  and  coUdc* 
tion  of  direct  taxes  and  internal  dutie$» 

A  bill  imposing  adc^tional  duties  q% 
the  tonnige  of  ships  and  vessels. 

A  bill  to  retain  25  per  centtim  on  pe 
drawbacks  allowed  by  law.  -^^ 

A  bill  laying  a  duty  on  imported  salt^, 

A  bill  to  establish  the  office  of  cqp- 
missioner  of  the  Revenue.  vi 

A  bill  ;o  lay  duties  on  licenses  to 
tailers  of  wines,  spirituous  liquors^ 
fore)^  merctaaiiuiac. 

A  bill  to  lay  duties  on  carriages  for  i 
conveyance  of  persons. 

/\.  bill  to  lay  duties  on  licenses  to  dis^ 
tillers  of  spirituous  liquors.  [Whisyj^ 
Tax-l  .  ^1 

A  bill  laying  Juties  on  sales  at  aucti(f| 
of  foreign  merchandise,  and  of  ships  tOr 
vessels. 

A  bill  laying  duties  on  sugar  refii 
within  the  United  Stales. 

A  bill  laying  duties  on  bank  not 
and  on  notes  of  hand,  and  on  forei|hi 
bills  of  exchange  of  a  certain  descriptira* 
[Stamp  Tax.] 

A  bill  making  further  provision  for  $tft 
Collection  of  internal  duties^ 


of! 


War  ol  i8i2.    An  address  ot  meml^fs  of  the  House  of  Representatives 

>ss  to  their  constituents  on  the  subject  of  the  war  with  Great  Britain.    8vo, 

uncut.      Philadelphia    (i8i2).        W/.^ _^.  *^;|° 


# 


«i^: 


